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Cover Page Footnote

The author would like to thank Prof. Allison Hodgkins, Prof. Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat, and Prof. Magda Shahin for their academic supervision and revision of this paper.

Selective State Penetration: The Nexus between Ungovernability and Terrorism in Egypt's Northern Sinai (2011-2016)

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ABSTRACT

Although Egypt experienced an unprecedented wave of political violence post-2011, terrorism in the North Sinai province is distinct in terms of sheer numbers, lethality, operational sophistication, and the range of actors involved in carrying out attacks. The objective of this paper is to provide an empirical explanation for why terrorism in Northern Sinai started earlier, lasted longer, was more frequently claimed, and was simply more deadly than in other Egypt provinces. The paper utilizes in-depth interviews with representatives of NGOs in Northern Sinai, journalists, residents, and security officials, as well as socio-economic data, terrorist incidents, and counter-terrorism operations to analyze the trends that have emerged since 2013. Initial conclusions suggest that ungovernability increases the opportunity of terror, but selective state presence, provides the trigger for escalation. For the sake of enriching the literature, this paper provides an analytical explanatory framework that expands the concept of ungovernability to include measures of relative deprivation and repression.

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I. Introduction

Historically, the Sinai Peninsula was considered the center of conflict between Egypt and Israel; these tensions subsided after the Peace Treaty in 1979. Immediately after the Egyptian revolution in 2011, North Sinai province witnessed an escalated wave of terrorism by different extremist militant groups (Tuitel, 2013; Said & Elkady, 2013, p.5). More than fifteen extremist militant groups were formed in North Sinai (Siboni, G., & Barak, 2014, p. 6). Immediately, after the ousting of Islamist President Mursi in July 2013, the level of terrorist attacks in North Sinai has become severe (Dyer & Kessler, 2014, p. 5). Notably, terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the Sinai Peninsula, where the peninsula witnessed the first wave of terrorist attacks between 2004 and 2006 in South Sinai (Pelham, 2012a, pp. 3-4).


The academic literature regarding the causal explanations of terrorism encompasses poverty, political repression, transitional democracy, relative deprivation, clash of civilization, ungoverned space, and contagion theory. This study conducts an analytical review of those causal explanations to analyze their relevance to the case study of North Sinai; and accordingly, the conceptual framework and methodology are demarcated.

II. Research Problem

Since the two political transitions in 2011 and 2013, Egypt experienced different forms of political violence and terrorism phenomena. The terrorist attacks that took place in Greater Cairo, Alexandria, Western Desert, Fayoum, Beni Suef, and Sharqia have seen a decline (TIMEP, 2015j, p. 9), while North Sinai (in the cities of Rafah, Sheikh Zewaid, and Al-Arish) experienced a growing cycle and speedy increase of terrorism, particularly against the state security establishments, state institutions, international forces, and infrastructure - see figures 1 & 2 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP, 2015a, pp. 2, 8-9; TIMEP, 2015b, P. 9; TIMEP, 2015c, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015d, P. 2; TIMEP, 2015f, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015g, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015h, P. 12; TIMEP, 2016, P. 5).


Although the outer look at the terrorism curve in Egypt's North Sinai explains that the terrorist attacks are the results of ousting the Islamist former President Mursi in 2013, this does not explain the rise of terrorist attacks before and under Mursi's rule as well as the escalation of terror in comparison to other Egypt's regions, especially in late 2014 and 2015 - see figure 1 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP, 2015a, pp. 2, 8-9; TIMEP, 2015b, P. 9; TIMEP, 2015c, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015d, P. 2; TIMEP, 2015f, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015g, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015h, P. 12; TIMEP, 2016, P. 5). Therefore, the objective of this paper is to provide an empirical explanation for why terrorism in Northern Sinai started earlier, lasted longer, was more frequently claimed, and was simply more deadly than in other Egyptian provinces.

Figure 1
Number of Terrorists Attacks in North Sinai (2011-2015)



Sources: The data are collected by the author from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP, 2015a, pp. 2, 8-9; TIMEP, 2015b, P. 9; TIMEP, 2015c, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015d, P. 2; TIMEP, 2015f, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015g, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015h, P. 12; TIMEP, 2016, P. 5

Figure 2
Percentage of Total Target Type of the Terrorist Attacks in North Sinai (2011- 2014)



Sources: The figure is calculated by the author using the source of National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016.

III. Literature Review on the Causal Explanation of Terrorism

The existing literature on terrorism has multiple explanations for its causes, including poverty, regime type, relative deprivation, clash of civilizations, and ungoverned space. Some literature on the poverty explanation perceives a correlation with terrorism (Taspinar, 2009, pp. 1-2; Schmid, 2011, p. 249), whilst others refuted this correlation (Hundley, 2011, p. 19; Piazza, 2009, pp. 406-416; Krueger & Maleckova, 2002, pp. 1061-1062; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003, pp. 119-144). Although, poverty exists in the case of North Sinai, but also many other Egyptian regions experience poverty and do not experience the same scale and scope of violence as in North Sinai.

The cultural and globalization explanation perceives extremists Jihadist terror as the result of the disparity created by globalization as well as the difference between cultures and religions, in which the terror is used as a tool to produce changes in the US policy in the Middle East (Hundley, 2011, p. 20; Matusitz, 2013, pp. 12-14). Attacks on Egypt's Sinai could be explained in this frame only if US-Egypt cooperation and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty drive attacks. This treaty could explain why terror is concentrated in Northern Sinai, but not the rise in 2011 and 2013.

The regime type explanation of terrorism perceives that the democratic political system establishes an inclusive and functional political system, which can reduce the frustration that may foster terrorism (Lia, B. & Skolberg, 2004, pp. 34-39; Kaye, 2008, p. 163; Bandyopadhyay & Younas, 2011, pp. 171-175). Another piece of literature demonstrates that that countries experience a middle level of political freedom or democratic transitions are those more likely to experience a high level of terrorism (Abadie, 2006, pp. 1-9; Lia and Skolberg, 2004, pp. 34-39, 71). Accordingly, the regime type explanations offer little insight to explain the case of North Sinai as there were spikes of terror in the 1980s and 1990s on Egypt's mainland (Awad & Hashem, 2015, p. 7), but there was neither change in regime type nor political transition.

Other scholars argue that the causes of terrorism must be seen in a multi-dimensional framework, which includes socio-economic and political deprivation as a cause of terrorism. Abject poverty might not be a condition for breeding terrorism, but instead when the negative social, political, and economic relative deprivation converge may cause radicalism and terrorism phenomenon gets higher probability to ensue (Taspinar, 2009; Dias & Bravo, 2006, pp. 329-341; Davis, 1999). This deprivation is not absolute, but relative to those excluded groups from the state apparatus, who might use violence as a means to revenge or change their economic and political status (Matusitz, 2013, pp. 15-16; Güre, 2009, pp. 1-24; Piazza, 2011, pp. 339-353; Piazza, 2012, pp. 521-546; Choi & Piazza, 2014, pp. 1-27; Cinar, 2010, pp. 56-57; Lia, B. & Skolberg, 2004; Schmid, 2011, p. 249). Given the known political and socio-economic gaps between North Sinai and the rest of Egypt's regions, the relative deprivation thesis has merit; however, has not been systematically explored.

A final causal explanation of terrorism with relevance to North Sinai is the notion that ungoverned spaces provide both grievance and opportunity for extremism to take hold. Ungoverned spaces do not merely space deficient from governance; instead, they are spaces where state control has been willingly or unwillingly yielded to or shared with actors not legally recognized as sovereign authorities such as tribes or insurgents; hence, these spaces are 'differently' governed. These spaces have social, economic, and political dimensions in which the exercise of sovereignty is not effective, and the state authority and functions are absent, weak, or

contested (Clunan & Trinkunas, 2010, p.17; Keister, 2014, p. 2; Swart, 2011, p. 44). Thus, ungoverned spaces provide a haven for extremist militants to operate as well as a fertile ground for the recruitment of uneducated and disadvantaged youth (Swart, 2011, p. 4; Bubalo, 2014, pp. 6-7; Abdel-Fattah, 2015, p. 26; Alterman, 2014, p. 2; Taspinar, 2009, p. 82).

Reviewing the literature about the causes of terrorism makes a *hypothesis* that both ungovernability and relative deprivation hold the most explanatory power for the case in North Sinai. Meanwhile, the existing scholarly literature is still underdeveloped in providing an analytical explanatory process of the relationship between ungovernability, relative deprivation, and terrorism. This invites a need for closer investigation of the case study of North Sinai to empirically explore the process of how the ungovernability dimensions and relative deprivation could generate terrorism through an interpretive case study approach.

IV. Research Design

i. Conceptual Framework

The conceptualization of the case study of North Sinai is based on the *four ungovernability dimensions, relative deprivation theory, and the concept of state repression*. Ungovernability is defined through four dimensions that are explained by the Rand Corporation study on “ungoverned territories”. These dimensions are a lack of state penetration into society, a monopoly on the use of force, control over borders, and external interference. These four dimensions cover the social, economic, and political dimensions; meanwhile, they consist of specific indicators that can be measured (Rabasa & Peters, 2007).

The first dimension is the *State Penetration into Society*, which evaluates the state presence, weakness, or absence of the state institutions, including welfare institutions such as health and education institutions. Moreover, it evaluates the power, authority, and legitimacy of the state institutions in comparison to other social institutions (tribes or clans). The state penetration into society is reflected in the degree of state authority to conduct law enforcement and compliance. For the sake of measuring and analyzing the state penetration into society, RAND defined three main indicators: *Physical Infrastructure* (“the physical dimension of the state’s presence in a space”), the *Corruption and the Prevalence of the Informal Economy*, and the *Social and Cultural Resistance to Penetration by State Institutions* (Rabasa & Peters, 2007, pp. 7-13). In this dimension, the paper uses the *relative deprivation* theory as well and its relation to political violence that is defined by Gur as ‘actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. The tension that develops from a discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value of satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence” (Gurr, 1970, pp. 23-24). Based on the relative deprivation theory and its further enhancements, this paper uses the concept of *State Repression* as the case study of North Sinai provides evidence of state repression. This concept is defined as “it involves the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, to impose a cost on the target as well as deter specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions” (Davenport, 2007, p. 2).

The second dimension is the *Monopoly on the Use of Force*, in spaces like remote areas where the state reach is weak, alternatives to this state monopoly emerge. Three main indicators measure this dimension: the *Presence of Organized Armed Groups outside the State’s Control*, the

Presence of Criminal Networks Linked to Terrorist or Insurgent Groups, and the Population with Access to Weapons (Rabasa & Peters, 2007, pp. 9-10).

The third dimension is *Control over borders*, in which most of the ungoverned spaces are always located in remote or border areas. States have challenges to control borders when extended tribes exist on both sides of borders or there are difficulties in achieving cooperation with the neighboring states. Insurgent or terrorist groups use the borders to move, trade and receive inputs (Rabasa & Peters, 2007, p. 12).

The fourth one is the *External Interference*, in the context of ungovernability, external interference means a direct or indirect interference by external power (commonly a bordering state) to exercise some political and economic control over the space. This occurs when an exterior power perceives a power vacuum and moves to fill it. In return, the external interference impedes the state's ability to control this space. The external interference not solely measures the role of these external actors, but also their ability to influence the internal dynamics within the state (Rabasa & Peters, 2007, pp. 12-13).

ii. Methodology

The *Data Collection* depends on both primary and secondary data resources. The primary resource includes conducting twenty in-depth interviews in a semi-structured approach with local citizens and Bedouins from North Sinai province, journalists who report from Sinai, government officials, academic scholars, and researchers. Primary resources also include terrorist incidence in North Sinai by depending on reliable database websites such as the START Global Terrorism Database (GTD) as well as Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP). The secondary resources include books, previous academic studies, policy papers, reports, governmental database websites, and published interviews with the population of North Sinai.

There is no consensus on the terrorism concept neither on the policymaking side nor on the academic side. After analyzing the various concepts of terrorism, the author found that many conceptions are very ambiguous and some of them are defined according to particular cases of terrorism. Hence, this paper uses the definition of GTD which defines terrorism as "*the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation*" ("Data Collection Methodology", n.d.). This definition is clear and consistent with the literature.

Regarding the *Data Analysis and study approach*, this study uses the *interpretive process tracing approach*, which allows using the concepts/themes in the outlined conceptual framework as a chain to explain the collected data on how ungovernability dimensions interact and produce terrorism. Furthermore, this study uses some basic descriptive statistical methods to show the terrorism curve, causality curve, target types, and attacks by groups.

V. First Dimension of Ungovernability: Measurement of the Egyptian Monopoly on the Use of Force and Its Interconnectedness to Terrorism

i. First Indicator: Presence of Extremist Militant Groups in North Sinai


The first presence of the extremist militant groups in North Sinai started with the emergence of the Tawhid Wal-Jihad group that conducted different activities between 2004-2006; the police were

able to suppress this group by the end of 2006 (“Al Tawhid Wal Jihad”, n.d.). Between 2011 and 2016, more than fifteen extremist groups (ex: Sinai Province of the Islamic State – SPIS, Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula, Majlis Shura Al-Mujahideen, Army of Islam, Jund Al-Islam - approximately 2,000 militants) were formed and started operations. The members of these groups include radicalized Bedouins (especially from Tarabeen and Sawarka tribes), Salfi extremists affiliated to other extremist groups in Gaza, escaped and released extremist prisoners (took North Sinai as a safe haven), militants from Hamas, foreign fighters with Arab and African nationalities, Egyptian Jihadists who spent time in Afghanistan and returned after 2012, and some criminal smugglers who turned into terrorist groups (Alexandrani, 2015, p. 2; Dyer & Kessler, 2014, p. 32-44; Dentice, & Paolo, 2014, pp. 78-80; Gaub, 2015, p. 3; Gold, 2014, pp. 7-8; Yaari, 2012, p. 2; Pelham, 2012b, pp.3-4; Reuters/Stringer, 2014, pp. 2-4; Benari, 2012; a former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March 13, 2016; A Bedouin teacher from Al-Sawarka tribe and a prominent member in a developmental NGO based in North Sinai, personal communication, February 4, 2016; A former governor of North Sinai, personal communication, February 6, 2016).

▪ **The Monopoly on the Use of Force Post 2011 Revolution: Comparing the State versus the Extremist Militant Groups Strength**


There was a weakness of the Egyptian monopoly on the use of force post-2011 revolution until mid-2013 in favor of the extremist militant groups. Since 2015 the military achieved predominance over the militant groups as the number of casualties is much higher on the militant side in comparison to casualties on the security forces’ side as a result of the counter-terrorism campaign by the Egyptian military - see figures 3 and 4 (Hassan, Bayoumy, & Woods, 2015, p. 4; Isaac, 2016, pp. 89-110; Ralph, 2012; Halawi, 2011). This does mean the deterrence of those militant groups as the terrorist attacks still occur in North Sinai due to two challenges. First, the issue of the Egyptian monopoly on the use of force in North Sinai province is not limited to cities like Al-Arish and the main roads, but the poor villages in Sheikh Zwaid, Al-Hasana, Al-Nekhl, Mehdiya, Madfuna, and Nage Shibana that are considered the hub of militants (A former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March 13, 2016; Sabry, 2015, pp. 203-230). The second one is the invisibility of the militants, which hide betamongtizens as many of them come from local tribes. A militant from the Sinai Province of the Islamic State (SPIS) said, “At the start of the fighting we used to hide in mountains, but now we are present in the villages among residents, because it is safer there” (Reuters/Stringer, 2014, p. 3).

Figure 3
Comparing the Militant Attacks versus the Egyptian Security Forces Attacks (2011-2015)



Source: Hassan, Bayoumy, & Woods, 2015, p.4

Figure 4
Comparing the Casualties among Extremist Militant Groups and Egyptian Security Forces (2011-2015)



Sources: Isaac, 2016, pp. 89-110; Ralph, 2012; Halawi, 2011

ii. Second Indicator: North Sinai’s Bedouins with Access to Weapons

The population’s access to weapons reflects the weakness of the state monopoly on the use of force. The prevalence of weapons among Bedouins is very common in the Sinai Peninsula. As the

state presence is weak in North Sinai, the Bedouins used to possess weapons to protect their lands and property, which led to a proliferation of weapons among Bedouins (A former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March 13, 2016). The Bedouins' possession of weapons reflects the State of Nature according to Hobbes when there was no state, and everyone should protect his property. Furthermore, as any economic property requires security protection, the proliferation of tunnels post 2007 not only increased the quantity and quality of weapons as a result of arms smuggling, but it has urged the need for smugglers to increase their level of armament to protect these tunnels (A female human rights activist and resident in North Sinai, personal communication, November 30, 2015).

During the 2011 revolution, the level of violence by Bedouins against police and security establishments was higher than in other Egypt's provinces because North Sinai is an armed society (Hauslohner, 2013). Therefore, the Bedouins' accessibility to weapons affected negatively on the state's monopoly on the use of force, and in return increased the state's inability to govern effectively.

iii. Third Indicator: Presence of Criminal Networks Linked to Terrorist Groups

Among the indicators of the weakness of monopoly on the use of force is the presence of criminal networks linked to terrorist groups. The fusion of identities and interdependent interests between the smuggler Bedouins and extremist militant groups happened due to numerous factors (Pelham, 2012b, p.14). Initially, some of those who are part of the extremist militant groups were originally smugglers, such as Shadi-Manei, the former leader of the SPIS group (Z. Gold, personal communication, December 2, 2015). Furthermore, both Bedouins smugglers and militants have an interdependent relationship in the arms smuggling process through the underground tunnels (O. Al-Salami, personal communication, November 28, 2015; Anonymous political researcher specialized in security studies, personal communication, February 3, 2016).

Most notably, both Bedouin smugglers and militants have interests in no state control. An indicator that interprets the increase of terror post ousting Mursi, the smugglers enjoyed the anarchy that prevailed under Mursi's rule and his passivity towards the underground tunnels to support Hamas, and the counter-terrorism campaign against the underground tunnels post-July 2013 affected them negatively as it devastated their business (Hauslohner, 2013). Therefore, the possibility of cooperation between the smuggler Bedouins and militants increased post the counter-terrorism campaign as currently, both shared a common enemy 'state's security apparatus. For instance, the smugglers who killed some Egyptian border security guards are not extremist militants (Holt-Ivry, 2014, p. 106). This gives an indicator that the smuggler Bedouins are not solely cooperating with militants in smuggling weapons but also indicates the involvement of smuggler Bedouins in terrorist activities as their economic interest is under threat by the government.

Hence, the terrorist attacks by the extremist militant groups, Bedouins' accessibility to weapons, and the linkage between criminal smuggler networks indicate the weakness of the state monopoly on the use of force. One might conclude that the weakness of monopoly on the use of force has deteriorated further as a result of the weakness of state penetration into North Sinai society.

VI. Second Dimension of Ungovernability: State Penetration into North Sinai Society

i. First Indicator: Weakness of Physical Presence of the State and Relative Deprivation of Bedouins

The state penetration into North Sinai society was very limited economically, socially, and politically. Since the restoration of the Sinai Peninsula in 1982, Egypt planned to achieve development in the region, but only the private sector-led development in South Sinai, whilst North Sinai province was left underdeveloped. It is neither equipped with agriculture nor industry infrastructure, in addition to the absence of urban transportation facilities that can connect North Sinai to the other Nile Valley provinces (Holt-Ivry, 2014, p. 8; Yaari, 2012, pp. 11-12; Dyer & Kessler, 2014, p. 21; Pelham, 2012a, p. 17).

The weakness of the physical presence of the state has caused a combined feeling of socio-economic and political relative deprivation among Bedouins. Socio-economically, North Sinai is considered the poorest border province, among the four poorest provinces in Egypt, and contains 26 out of 1,000 poorest villages in Egypt (Social Fund for Development, 2013, p. 26 & Sadeany, 2014). Bedouins have a distinct identity that is oriented eastward than the rest of Egypt, and their identity crisis was intensified by their marginalization from the state development projects, exclusion from public sector jobs such as police and army, land property right, and most considerably Egypt's central government perception to them as spies of Israel, smugglers, and recently as terrorists. This untrusted government's perception led to politically depriving local Bedouins of the participation in the state policymaking process (A female human rights activist and resident in North Sinai, personal communication, November 30, 2015; A prominent member of Al-Sawarka tribe, Personal communication, November 30, 2015; Siboni & Barak, 2014, p.3-4; Joya, & Gormus, 2015, pp. 52-53; Pelham, 2012b, p. 2; A former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March 13, 2016; K. Dawoud, personal communication, December 1, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2007, pp. 3-19; Yaari, 2012, p. 12; O. Al-Salami, personal communication, November 28, 2015; Walton, Gerges, & Gilbert, 2012, p. 7).

ii. Second Indicator: The Prevalence of Corruption and Underground Economy

The lack of physical presence of state and socio-economic underdevelopment situation created a prevalence of corruption and complex networks of the underground economy including human trafficking and all sorts of smuggling through digging underground tunnels between North Sinai and Gaza Strip. Notably, this constituted the main source of Bedouins' income and has developed the livelihood of People in North Sinai (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108). The Sawarka (extends in Al-Arish, Rafah, and Shaykh Zuweid cities), Tarabeen (the most populous tribe and extends alongside the Egypt-Gaza border) and Rumaylat tribes mainly manage the smuggling operations. These commercial ties between the North Sinai Bedouins and people in Gaza Strip were reinforced by historical, ethnic, and linguistic ties (Pelham, 2012a, pp. 1-5; Gold, 2013, pp. 3-4). The lack of state penetration into society has introduced a new issue of control over borders.

Figure 5
Map of Tribes in the Sinai Peninsula



Source: Watanabe, 2015, p.2

During the proliferation of the underground tunnels, the state was present but was corrupt. The Egyptian State Security Investigations Service (SSI) allowed the smugglers to operate under the condition of having a balanced relationship with the state authority. A former governor of North Sinai said, “The SSI left the smugglers and jihadists as part of a deal: we will not harm you as long as you don’t harm us” (Personal communication, February 6, 2016). The state perceived that using repression complemented by allowing the underground tunnels was the most suitable approach to maintaining security in the tribal border area as the state found that from 2006 until 2011 the Sinai Peninsula was fully secured and free of terrorism (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108). Hence, it is obvious that the state followed the traditional concept of national security that includes the security sector only, rather than, the comprehensive concept that encompasses not only the security sector, but also the social, economic, and political ones.

Therefore, the lack of psychological presence of the state, as well as lack of control over borders, led to a proliferation of underground economy that eroded further the state penetration into society. Meanwhile, it seems that the state was satisfied by the underground economy as it lifted a heavy financial burden of development away from the state’s shoulder. The population and tribes were considered the main beneficiaries of these tunnels and shutting down of these tunnels created a threat to their livelihood.

iii. Third Indicator: Social and Cultural Resistance to Penetration by State Institutions - State Legitimacy and Authority versus other Social Institutions

The socio-economic and political relative deprivation among Bedouins has caused social and cultural resistance to penetration by state institutions in North Sinai society. The state never held legitimate authority over the peninsula, but other informal social institutions conduct ‘gap-filling’ (Joya, & Gormus, 2015, p. 52; K. Dawoud, personal communication, December 1, 2015; A.

Schleifer, personal communication, November 25, 2015; Revkin, 2014, pp. 34-38).

a) State's Proxy Governance: Tribal or Urf Law and Legitimacy of Tribal Leaders

Since the rule of the Ottoman Empire, the traditional form of social governance in North Sinai is the 'Urf law' (Gold, 2013, p.9). Based on different interviews conducted by the author, it is found that the state neither has had legitimacy in this tribal society nor the state law exceeded the strength of the Urf law. A former governor of North Sinai said, "if a Bedouin conducts an act against the law and sentenced five years by the state law, this would not excuse him from fulfilling the tribal jurisdiction, he should be presented in front of Urf jurisdiction also" (Personal communication, February 6, 2016). In the same context, a former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate said, "The police and judges represent nothing for Bedouins" (Personal communication, March 13, 2016). As the Urf law does not contradict the state law, the state was able to conduct *Proxy Governance* in North Sinai by informally appointing the elder tribal leaders who used to keep law and order in the province (Revkin, 2014, pp. 34-38; Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108; Gold, 2013, p.9). After the extremist terrorist attacks from 2004-to 2006, the state went further and supported the Urf law, and gave salaries to Urf judges, which made the Urf law more institutionalized. Therefore, the tribal leaders/Urf law represented the social institution that has more legitimacy over the state legitimacy, and this facilitated the state's presence in society, but through the proxy form of governance.

b) The Fall Down of State's Proxy Governance and Emergence of Smugglers as the New Tribal Elite

The rise of the smuggling business in North Sinai has caused a shift in the tribal society, in which the power and legitimacy of the elder tribal leaders have eroded in favor of the new tribal elite 'the smugglers' who have money, power, and weapons. The youth Bedouins started to perceive those elder tribal leaders as appointed government officials who are not able to fulfill their needs. Consequently, those new tribal smugglers elite were able to impose leverage on the youth Bedouins. (A former governor of North Sinai, personal communication, February 6, 2016; Gold, 2014, p. 7; Z.; Sabry, 2015, pp. 203-230; Anonymous EX-Radical Islamist and Researcher specialized in the Islam Militant Movements, personal communication, November 30, 2015). Although before the 2011 revolution, the state legitimacy was fragile, but it was able to govern North Sinai through the tribal leaders and Urf law. Post-2011 revolution, the legitimacy, and upper hand were neither in the hands of the state nor Urf law, but it has become concentrated in hands of the new smuggler elite.

c) Emergence of Non-State Sharia Courts of North Sinai

In addition to the rise of new smugglers' tribal elite post-2011 revolution, there was a change in North Society through the emergence of non-state Sharia courts that seized more power and influence as a result of the weakness of both Urf law and state legitimacy. These courts were operated by Sinai Salafist Sheikhs (or Sharia judges as they describe themselves), who reject the Egyptian legal system even under Mursi's rule. They are self-appointed and self-trained; their ideology is based on Salafism, and their jurisdiction is based on the Sharia law. Those Salafist judges operated underground between the 1990s and 2000s, and roughly fourteen Sharia courts

started to emerge publicly and seize more influence after 2011. The people in North Sinai started to resort to these courts instead of resorting to Urf judges or the legal state court system, as the Bedouins perceived Sharia judges as less corrupt than the tribal judges (Revkin, 2013, Revkin, 2015, pp. 11-16). Although these courts lack the enforcement mechanism, since they operate in a tribal society that is based on collectivism principles, they were using other powerful tools such as social pressure and intimidation (Revkin, 2015, p. 11).

Since 2013, the government has launched arrest campaigns against those Sharia judges (Revkin, 2013). Those Sharia judges rejected June 30 revolution and perceived the counter-terrorism campaigns in North Sinai as an organized state crime that would generate more revenge attitude against the government (Revkin, 2015). Sheikh Hamdeen Abu Faisal, Sharia Judge said, "There is a long line of people seeking revenge" (Revkin, 2014, pp. 43-44). Therefore, unlike the Urf law which does not encourage this violent extremism, the rise of non-state Sharia courts eroded the state proxy governance institution and facilitated the spread of radical ideology among the North Sinai population.

iv. The Nexus between Selective State Penetration into North Sinai Society, Relative Deprivation and Radicalization

The case of North Sinai reflects a wide extent that the major cause of radicalization and joining the extremist militant group is not solely due to poverty, but due to the feeling of relative deprivation combined with a selective state penetration that is resembled state repression. Exceptionally in some incidence, the use of violence against the state in North Sinai could be as a result of the relative deprivation or state repression solely, but commonly the use of violence by Bedouins against the state is as a result of combined relative deprivation and selective state penetration.

According to the anthropological studies on the Sinai Bedouins community, the dominant thought was either Sufism or atheism, but the Jihadism ideology did not exist. It is even contradictory to the tribal thoughts, culture, and values. The first two radicalized Bedouins were the Bedouin dentist Khaled Messad (from the Sawarka tribe) and (Nasser al-Mallahi Sinai-Palestinian); both formed the Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad group. Due to lack of state penetration into society and relative deprivation among youth Bedouins, Messad gained influence through preaching in mosques and promoting the jihadi ideology; and succeeded to recruit around 40 Bedouins from his Masaaid clan, Tarabeen tribe as well as from other impoverished villages in Sheikh Zwaid and Rafah. In 2004, Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad group formed and conducted different terrorist attacks 2004-2006 in South Sinai (International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 4; Yaari, 2012, p. 5; Sabry, 2015, pp. 125-130; "Al Tawhid Wal Jihad", n.d.; "Tawhid Wal-Jihad", 2014).

Post the terrorist attacks of 2004, the state started to penetrate selectively in North Sinai society by conducting state repression, in which the state attempted to get authority over the region through harsh security measures rather than confronting the radical ideologies and developing the province. The only presence of the state was in form of state repression by the Egyptian State Security Investigations Service (SSI) under the emergency law (Joya, & Gormus, 2015, pp. 52-53; Pelham, 2012a, p.2; Pelham, 2012b). The SSI started a massive campaign and arrested 3,000 detainees (as estimated by Human Rights Watch) from North Sinai, and some claimed being tortured during the investigation as well as arresting family members of suspected terrorists as

means for obtaining confessions (Siboni & Barak, 2014, pp. 4-5; Gold, 2014, pp. 6-7; Pelham, 2012a, p. 3; Sabry, 2015, pp. 51-08; International Crisis Group, 2007, pp. 3-4). According to the interviews conducted by the author, it is found a consensus that this approach kept security in Sinai between 2007 to 2011, but it did not enhance the state penetration into society; ironically, the combined feeling of state repression and relative deprivation have bred more a sort of radicalization among tribe members, especially the youth who wanted to get revenge from the state. This facilitated the emergence of the Salfi associations in Rafah, Sheikh Zewaid, and Bir Al-Abd. The spread of radical ideology was clear in the way the youth Bedouins dress, their disobedience to the tribal leaders, their boycott of the Egyptian government officials, and their campaign to promote the Jihadi ideology. An anonymous Bedouin said, "Every tribe and family in the Sinai saw a number of its youth joining these Salafi trends." (Yaari, 2015, p. 5).

Following the outbreak of the 2011 revolution, the selective state penetration that was resembled in SSI's collapse and this jihadi ideology has transformed into terror against the state. However, the population across Egypt used violence against the police in 2011, but North Sinai was among the top places that witnessed violence as a result of selective state penetration feeling. Many armed Bedouins conducted violent acts in Al-Arish city, blocked roads, and participated in gas pipeline bombings. Many spaces like Wadi Amr and Jabal al-Halal turned into defense bases for extremist Bedouins, especially for those extremist Bedouins who escaped during the prison break in 2011 and had already interacted with a lot of jihadists in the prison; among them the former leader of ABM, Tawfiq Farqik Ziada from Sawarka tribe (A. Sakr, personal communication, November 11, 2015; Sabry, 2015, pp. 1-30; Al-Yaari, 2012; p.8; Anonymous EX-Radical Islamist and Researcher specialized in the Islam Militant Movements, personal communication, November 30, 2015). The economic targeting of the gas pipeline by Bedouins resembled a clear case of relative deprivation. The security guard of the gas pipeline in North Sinai said that there were five masked men and the one who spoke had a native Bedouin accent saying, "This has nothing to do with you, leave right now, or you will be shot" (Sabry, 2015, pp. 31-50). Moreover, a tribal elder said that it is impossible for a stranger to conduct these terrorist attacks without the help of local Bedouins (Sabry, 2015, pp. 31-50). Thus, both the relative deprivation and selective state penetration have caused radicalization among some Bedouins, which resulted in the terror against the Egyptian state.

The initiation of the counter-terrorism campaign post-July 2013 represented another phase of selective state penetration. The Bedouins suffered from suspicious treatment by the security forces. A Bedouin from the Al-Sawarka tribe said, "Everyone from Rafah and Sheikh Zewaid in the eye of the army is a terrorist unless you prove the opposite" (Personal communication, February 4, 2016). In some cases, the military airstrikes hurt civilians and their properties (Reuters/Stringer, 2014, p. 3; El-Fekki, Fahmy, & Nader, 2015; Mehmood, 2015, pp. 13-14). Moreover, the counter-terrorism campaign closed the underground tunnels that represented the main source of many Bedouins' income.

The expansion of the buffer zone in Rafah and demolition of citizens' houses and cultivated lands have intensified the feeling of relative deprivation among the inhabitants as the demolition made no distinction between the houses that operate tunnels and others that are free of tunnels. Thousands of inhabitants left their homes, and some of them resorted to living in tents until they receive their compensation and find alternative housing. Many inhabitants found the

compensation is not adequate to buy a new house. Moreover, the increased demand for housing by the displaced inhabitants in Rafah increased the housing prices. Additionally, the government did not compensate people for the cultivated lands as it considered them empty lands. Many people suffered the loss of income that is connected to their place, especially those who have cultivated lands (Houry & Porteous, 2015; A prominent member of Al-Sawarka tribe, Personal communication, November 30, 2015; Personal communication, February 4, 2016; Y. Werdany, personal communication, February 3, 2015).

The selective state penetration post-July 2013 through the counter-terrorism campaign increased the feeling of revenge and relative deprivation. A Bedouin teacher from the Sawarka tribe said, “Radicalization is prevalent among youth, you could see in one house, one member supports the army, and another supports the extremist militants” (Personal communication, February 4, 2016). These extremist militant groups were able to conduct recruitment from Sinai youth Bedouins, especially from Sawarka and Tarabeen tribes (“Confessions of arrested terrorists in the Sinai”, 2013; “Confession of the traitor Ahmed Salama about his work with the terrorists”, 2015; Hassan, Bayoumy, & Woods, 2015, p. 6; M. Salah, personal communication, November 30, 2015; S. Issac, personal communication, December 8, 2015; Y. Werdany, personal communication, February 3, 2015). An anonymous security officer in North Sinai said that a militant interrogating him said that he participated in violence against the security forces as he wanted to take revenge from the security forces (Georgy & Woods, 2015, p.5). Before the initiation of the counter-terrorism campaign, an anonymous Bedouin witnessed only five people in his village fight for SPIS, but after the counter-terrorism campaign that almost destroyed 90% of his village, he witnessed around 40 members fight for SPIS (Schenker, 2015, pp. 6-7). Although counter-terrorism killed and arrested many militants, it has expanded the state’s enemies and established a base of recruitment where the militants can employ many repressed Bedouins.

In some cases, economic relative deprivation is the only factor that is related to recruitment. According to different residents of North Sinai and security officials, the leaders of terrorist groups offer the young recruits’ wives, houses, and money (Reuters/Stringer, 2014, p. 4). A Bedouin teacher from the Sawarka tribe said, “The militants used the poverty situation to recruit youth Bedouins to place bombs, those youth are not radicalized, but like drug addicts and criminals, they do that for money only” (Personal communication, February 4, 2016). One of the confessions by a Bedouin terrorist who does not seem to be radicalized, called Ahmed Faraj Alkika said, “I have been working with militant groups for nine months with a monthly salary of 10,000 Egyptian Pounds” (“Confessions Ahmed Faraj Alkika about his work with terrorists in Sheikh Zuweid, 2015). Moreover, the SPIS group asked the harmed citizens to join the fight against the militant groups, and they have been offering them money and donations and promised to get revenge from the military that destroyed their property (Anonymous EX-radical Islamist and researcher specialized in the Islam militant movements, personal communication, November 30, 2015; Shay, 2016, p. 3).

The extremist militant groups, especially SPIS were effectively offering the deprived and suppressed youth Bedouins an identity and membership, and a means to achieve their goals, it could be money, identity, revenge from the state, or all of it. This kind of selective state penetration does not enhance the security situation; ironically, it increases the probability of terror to occur.


Therefore, this paper defines the ‘Selective State Penetration into Society’ as a lack of the state capacity and state willingness to penetrate remote regions economically and socially but solely intervenes repressively to maintain security in the region.

VII. Third Dimension of Ungovernability: Control over Borders in North Sinai

The withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip and the winning of Hamas in the 2006 elections that followed by the imposition a blockade over the Gaza Strip had introduced a new turning point in losing control over borders through the flourishing of underground tunnels between the Gaza Strip and North Sinai province. Following 2007, the legal Rafah crossing between Sinai and Gaza has become one of the most important means for Gaza daily life needs. Shortly, the Egyptian government started to accuse Hamas of supporting the militant groups in Sinai and using the Peninsula as a space for the missiles testing and restricted the movement through the Rafah crossing in 2008. Consequently, the extended tribes started to develop trade and commercial ties with North Sinai Bedouins through constructing underground tunnels (Pelham, 2012a, pp. 10-14).

Figure 6

Number of the Underground Tunnels between Gaza and North Sinai (2007-2013)



Sources: Sabry, 2015, p.86; Shay, 2016, p.2

As it is shown in figure 6, until the mid of 2007, the underground tunnels did not exceed 20 tunnels. By October 2013, the total number of tunnels reached 1900 roughly. The first tunnels started by 150 to 300 meters, but later some tunnels reached 1,500 meters long and 2 meters wide (Sabry, 2015, p.85-108; Shay, 2016, p. 2) Basically, two kinds of underground tunnels were developed. The main tunnels are considered the economic tunnels used to bring commodities, heavy construction materials and raw materials from Egypt to Gaza. The second complex type of underground tunnels were used by Hamas to protect itself through hiding stockpile of rockets and launchers as well as smuggling weapons through Sinai to Gaza (Eldar, 2014; Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108).

However, the normal path of arms trafficking had been from Sinai to Gaza, but after the Egyptian revolution in 2011, the arms trafficking route was sometimes reversed from Gaza to Sinai as there was a demand from the extremist militants in North Sinai (Yaari, 2012, p. 6). The tunnels helped militants to transfer and store weapons as well as hide inside it as part of guerrilla warfare (Anonymous EX-radical Islamist and researcher specialized in the Islam militant movements, personal communication, November 30, 2015; Z. Gold, personal communication, December 2, 2015; Hassan, Bayoumy, & Woods, 2015, p. 3).

In 2009 (under pressure of US and Israel) and in early August 2012, Egypt started to raid the tunnels, but both campaigns were ineffective as the tunnels were more sophisticated, longer and deeper than the campaign targeted (Gold, 2014, pp. 12-13; Dyer & Kessler, 2014, p. 18). A former governor of North Sinai said, “The state did not allow the smuggling operations, at the time I was the Commander of the Egyptian Border Guards Force, and we destroyed every tunnel we knew, but the problem is that tunnels were developed and built inside private houses of Bedouins” (Personal communication, February 6, 2016). Thus, this does not solely reflect the degree of lack of the Egyptian state control over borders, but it shows as well lack of psychological presence of state that pushed the citizens to resort to the underground economy that in turn led to the weakness of state penetration into society and weakness of control over borders.

One of the most important indicators of a state control over borders is its ability to coordinate with the neighboring authorities ‘ Hamas and Israel’. There has been an unprecedented coordination between Israel and Egypt since July 2013 as both under threat from the extremist militant groups. As Israeli official put it “We coordinate when it comes to activities near the (border) fence in order to prevent terrorist attacks potentially spreading into Israel” (Georgy & Woods, 2015, p. 4). Meanwhile, it is found unprecedented weakness of cooperation between Egypt and Hamas in securing borders since July 2013, as Egypt considers Hamas an extension of its enemy “Muslim Brotherhood. A former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate said, “There is no coordination with Hamas as it keeps threatening Egypt’s national security (Personal communication, March 13, 2016). Moreover, it seems that the war against the tunnels has deteriorated further Hamas-Egypt relations. Specifically, raiding tunnels puts legitimacy of Hamas in Gaza under doubts, as it would not be able to deliver goods to Gaza citizens.


Therefore, the weakness of control over borders is a result of weakness of state penetration into society and lack of monopoly on the use of force. However, the state started to resume control over borders since July 2013, but the weakness to control borders between 2007 and 2013 increased the level of ungovernability, that in return increased the level of armament of the local militant groups as well as opened the floor for external interference by different non-state actors to gain leverage and power in North Sinai province.

VIII. Fourth Dimension of Ungovernability: External Interference

The figure 7 explains that the weakness of state penetration into society, weakness of monopoly on the use of force, and weakness of control over borders eased the external interference by different non-state actors. The Israeli external influence through Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty affected negatively on Egypt’s monopoly on the use force; in return, opened the floor for other

extremist actors from Gaza Strip to interfere and fill the power vacuum. Significantly, the Middle East regional security crisis escalated the nature and intensity of terrorism in North Sinai province through the flow of weapon, militants and institutional linkage of SPIS group to the IS. Thus, it seems that the seeds of North Sinai terrorism might be local, but the expansion and escalation of terrorism in North Sinai have been reinforced by the regional determinate.

Figure 7
External Influence and Regional Dimension




Note: This figure is visualized by the author to summarize section VIII.

i. External Influence of Israel: Restrictions of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty 1979 on the Monopoly on the Use of Force

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979 is a cross-section indicator between both the external interference and monopoly on the use of force dimensions. Specifically, this treaty represents a clear indicator of external influence by Israel as it has placed military restrictions on the Egyptian state monopoly on the use force in Sinai territory through allowing only limited number of troops in zone A and B, and demilitarization of zone C - see map/figure 14 (Watanabe, 2015, p. 4; “Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty”, 1979). Notably, the increase of terrorist attacks by the extremist militants has led to increase in the coordination between Israel and Egypt, which enabled Egypt to deploy large number of weapons that are banned by the Peace Treaty in Sinai (Aronson, 2015; Dyer, & Kessler, 2014, pp. 19-21).

Figure 8
Demilitarized Zones on the Sinai since 1979



Source: Watanabe, 2015

ii. Non-State Actors in Gaza Strip and Geographical Proximity to Conflict Zone

The first external interference was resembled by Gaza extremist militant groups in Southern Gaza that succeeded in imposing their ideological leverage over some Bedouins due to the cultural and social linkage. In 2009, many members of Gaza extremist militant groups such as the Jaish Al-Islam group were oppressed and pushed by Hamas to leave the Gaza Strip; they moved to North Sinai, where they were able to operate and attack Israel several times more freely from Sinai, with the understanding that Israel will not interfere militarily and fight them in Sinai due to the Peace Treaty (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108; Pelham, 2012a, p. 13; Yaari, 2012, p. 6). Due to lack of state penetration, those extremists were able to hide among citizens, especially in the villages that are away from the state reach. The existence of extremist Bedouins in the poor villages of North Sinai fostered the Gaza extremists' safety through providing them by a safe haven in their villages (Sabry, 2015, pp. 132-133). The influence of Gaza's extremists was clear on some Sinai Bedouins starting from 2010, in which the Sinai extremist started to preach with radical discourse in mosques of villages surrounding Sheikh Zwaid and Rafah. Al-Filistini said, "There was nothing to counter the radical rhetoric in Sinai, and they weren't preaching to doctors and engineers" (Sabry, 2015, pp. 132-133).

Notably, those extremists arrived two years before the rise of terrorism in 2011, but throughout those two years, the Gaza extremists succeeded in achieving an impact of spreading their ideologies and cause radicalization that has transformed into terror against the state post-2011 revolution. Moreover, the increase of ungovernability post-2011 revolution was an opportunity exploited by both Sinai and Gaza extremists to conduct many terrorist attacks ("Confessions of arrested terrorists in the Sinai", 2013). Moreover, there are extremist militant groups based in both

Sinai and Gaza such as Majlis Shura Al-Mujahideen (MSM) as well as Jaish Al-Islam that trained some Egyptian Jihadists and was blamed in 2012 of conducting cross border attack that killed 16 soldiers (“Jaish Al-Islam”, 2014; Dyer & Kessler, 2014, pp. 35- 41; Gold, 2014,p. 9; “Majlis Shura al-Mujahedeen”, n.d.; Maloof, 2013; Aftandilian, 2015, pp. 14-15; Shay, 2014, pp. 3-4).

The second external interference is resembled in Hamas that was able to impose its economic and military leverage over North Sinai Bedouins; especially, this was empowered by the historical and common family ties. Economically, Hamas succeeded to control the main income source of inhabitants of North Sinai, which made the citizens fully dependent on the underground tunnels. The economic benefits and clan interests allowed Hamas to make the smugglers more loyal to it as it is the reason behind their wealth (Pelham, 2012a, p.10; Sabry, 2015, pp. 51-84). Militarily, Hamas used Sinai as a strategic depth to store its arsenal and assets (Yaari, 2012, pp. 6-7). According to Omar Suliman’s testimony in Mubarak’s trial, the prison break of January 2011 that led escape of 23,710 prisoners was a result of a deal between Hamas and North Sinai Bedouins of supplying those Bedouins by weapons, in return they help Hamas to free the Hamas imprisoned members (Sabry, 2015, pp. 179-202). Among those prisoners, there were Egyptian jihadists including Bedouins who took Jabel Al-Halal Mountain in North Sinai as a safe haven and started to operate and conduct terrorist attacks against the state (Tuitel, 2013; Said & Elkady, 2013, p.5). However, Hamas did not conduct terrorist attacks against Egypt, but its interference has increased the ungovernability level in North Sinai, which in return facilitated the escalation of terror.

iii. The Regional Dimension and Escalation of Terrorism in North Sinai

The eruption of the Arab spring has created a regional security crisis; it is found that North Sinai was sharply affected by this crisis. First, there was a fall down of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes that were formerly able to suppress those extremist militant groups. Second, there was a fall down of intelligence institutions that previously were coordinating with Egyptian intelligence. Hence, all these have facilitated the flourishing, movement, training and armament of those extremist in the region as well recruitment of new members under the slogan of ‘Jihad for the sake of Allah’ with less oppression in spaces such as North Sinai (Siboni & Barak, 2014, p. 7; “Regional influence on terrorism in Egypt”, 2015).

Moreover, the Middle regional security crisis post the Arab Spring has created a fragile border security in the Arab world, in which it eased arms trafficking. The collapse of Gaddafi’s regime and the division of the Libyan army have created many ungoverned spaces, especially in the western part near the Egyptian-Libyan borders, in which it has become a safe haven for terrorists training and arms smuggling to the Egyptian territory (“Regional influence on terrorism in Egypt”, 2015; Pelham, 2012a, p.11).

The Middle East regional security crisis has resulted in movement of many foreign extremists from Somalia, Yemen, Algeria, Libya, Afghanistan, Syria, and Eastern Mali to North Sinai, who shared their experience with the radicalized local Bedouins (Siboni & Barak, 2014, p. 7). Moreover, many of Egyptian extremists who fought in Syria returned Egypt to represent a new trained extremist generation who transferred their jihadi experience to the local extremist of SPIS (Awad & Hashem, 2015, p. 21; Georgy & Woods, 2015, p. 5).

Unlike the traditional ideological link with Al-Qaeda state, in 2014 ABM (the most active local group in North Sinai) has pledged alliance to the Islamic State (IS) (Abdo, 2014). Afterwards,


it shifted its name from Ansar Beit Al-Maqdas (ABM) to the Sinai Province of the Islamic State (SPIS) or Wilayat Sinai (“Ansar Beit al-Maqdis”, 2015). Shortly, it has adopted the same black flag of the IS group, follows its same tactics as beheading of captives, and produces high quality edited videos (Anonymous, 2014), and above all it presented videos of controlling lands that reflects its intention to govern as the IS acted. Moreover, the application of SPIS to the regional radical discourse facilitated getting foreign fighters and financial support from the IS group.

In the very beginning, the majority of SPIS members were Bedouins, especially from Tarabeen tribe and Masaaid clan in Sawarka tribe as well as other extremists from different Egyptian regions, but they started to also include extremist from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Sudan and Somalia (Dentice, & Paolo, 2014, pp. 78-80; Kovac & Guertin, 2013, p. 2).

However, ABM was willing to align with Al-Qaeda, but the IS group provided logistical support, training, and weapons more than Al-Qaeda did (A. Sakr, personal communication, November 11, 2015; Lister, 2016, p. 16). It is confirmed that SPIS received financial and weaponry support from IS via the Gulf of Aqaba, Jordan, Syria through the Mediterranean Sea, and on a minor scale from the underground tunnels (A former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March 13, 2016; A Former Governor of North Sinai, personal communication, February 6, 2016; A. Sakr, personal communication, November 11, 2015).

Clearly, the external interference and regional dimension have led to escalation of terrorism intensity in North Sinai. According to figure 1, there has been an escalation of terrorism since October-December 2014, which coincides with the declaration of ABM alliance to the IS group. Moreover, according to figure 9 that represents number of terrorists by extremist militant groups, during October-December 2014, there was a rise of SPIS terrorist attacks, and a decline of the share of other groups’ terrorist attacks (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP, 2015c, P. p. 2; TIMEP, 2015b, p. 3; TIMEP, 2015g, p. 6; TIMEP, 2016, P. 5). Additionally, since declaring alliance to the IS, the most complex terrorist activities were conducted by SPIS. For instance, in July 2015, SPIS attacked 21 security facilities and checkpoints simultaneously that resulted in the death of dozens of Egyptian security forces. Moreover, it claimed responsibility for bombing the Russian plane in Sinai that was carrying 224 passengers (“Wilayat Sinai - The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy”, n.d.).


Figure 9
Number of Attacks by Extremist Militant Groups (2013-2015)



Source: The data are collected by the author from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP, 2015c, P. p. 2; TIMEP, 2015b, p. 3; TIMEP, 2015g, p. 6; TIMEP, 2016, P.5

Most notably, according to figure 10 (percentage of attacks by extremist militant groups), the terrorist attacks by the groups appear as a mirror; the rise of the terrorist attacks by SPIS coincided by a decline of terrorist attacks of the other groups (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP, 2015c; p. 2; TIMEP, 2015b, p. 3; TIMEP, 2015g, p. 6; TIMEP, 2016, P. 5). This can confirm the argument that SPIS was able to make alliance with all other local groups in North Sinai, except for roughly 50-60 members who rejected the Islamic State ideology, who formed ‘Al-Morabteen Group’ under the leadership of Hisham Ashmawy, and affiliated to Al-Qaeda (Anonymous EX-Radical Islamist and researcher specialized in the Islam militant movements, personal communication, November 30, 2015; Awad & Hashem, 2015, p. 18; A. Sakr, personal communication, November 11, 2015). This does not reflect solely the strength of SPIS, but it also reflects the level of armament and monetary support that were received from the IS group. Thus, the SPIS represented a symbol of the transitional terrorism in North Sinai.

Figure 10
Percentage of Attacks by Extremist Militant Groups (2013-2015)




Sources: The data are collected and calculated by the author from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP, 2015c; p. 2; TIMEP, 2015b, p. 3; TIMEP, 2015g, p. 6; TIMEP, 2016, P.5

IX. Conclusion: Correlation between the Ungovernability and Terrorism

The key finding of this paper shows a correlation between the ungovernability dimensions and terrorism phenomena in North Sinai province. A significant factor behind the escalation of terror post-2011 and 2013 is that North Sinai was selectively governed space. Through employing the different theories, concepts, and indicators, the paper developed an analytical explanatory framework of the nexus between the ungovernability dimensions and terrorism as it is summarized in figure 11 (This figure is not considered a new analysis or findings, but it summarizes the entire paper through illustration). This figure explains that the ungovernability seems like a chain, in which the fragility of one dimension causes fragility in the other dimensions. The principal dimension that affects the other three dimensions is lack of state penetration into society.

Figure 11
The Explanatory Analytical Framework of the Ungovernability – Terrorism Nexus (EAFUTN)



Note: This figure is developed by the author and not considered a new analysis or findings, but it summarizes the entire paper through illustration.

First, there was lack of state penetration into North Society due to weakness of the physical presence of the state in North Sinai. This last one has caused both relative deprivation among Bedouins and prevalence of underground tunnels between Gaza Strip and North Sinai. Additionally, the absence of strong state legitimacy authority has caused more social and cultural resistance to penetration by state institutions, in favor of other social institutions including non-state Sharia courts, new smuggler elite and extremist militant groups. Towards the end of controlling the region at hand, the state did not have the capacity and willingness to penetrate socially and economically, but selectively through state repression as it is less costly as it was perceived.

Second, there was a weakness of monopoly on use of force due to the restrictions of Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty 1979, that allowed the flourishing of more than fifteen extremist militant groups, opened the floor for Bedouins to access weapons, and created an opportunity for cooperation between the smuggler networks and extremist militant groups as both share common interests in arms smuggling.

Third, the weakness of both state penetration into society and monopoly on the use of force had facilitated the lack of control over borders. The border fragility appeared in developing roughly 1,900 underground tunnels between North Sinai and Gaza Strip in the periods of 2007-2013. Thus,

the borderland fragility allowed the flow of many extremist militants and weapons that increased the level of ungovernability and facilitated the proliferation of the radical ideologies and terrorism.

Fourth, the weakness of state penetration into society, weakness of monopoly on the use of force, and lack of control over borders eased the external interference by non-state actors who successfully gained ideological, economic, and military leverage in North Sinai. However, the external interference occurs due to the weakness of those three dimensions, but it requires conflict borderland countries, unstable regional condition or both as in the case of North Sinai that affected by Gaza Strip as a conflict borderland as well as the regional security crisis in the Middle East post the Arab Spring. Remarkably, the external interference escalated the terror and caused a transition in the nature and intensity of terror, in which transformed the terrorism from being local into transitional one.

Therefore, based upon this case of North Sinai, this paper enriches the existing literature through introducing an explanatory analytical framework on how the ungovernability dimensions produce terrorism that includes a new concept of ‘Selective State Penetration’ (see figure 16).

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Appendix: List of Interviewees

Name	Date and Place of the Personal communication	Title
A Female Human Rights Activist and Resident in North Sinai	Personal communication via email, November 30, 2016	A Female Human Rights Activist and Resident in North Sinai
Abdallah Schleifer	Personal interview, November 25, 2015 – Cairo, Egypt	Prominent Middle East expert
Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat	Personal interview, November 29, 2015 - Cairo, Egypt)	Professor of National Security, Future University in Egypt (FUE)
Ahmed Sakr	Personal communication via Viber, November 11, 2015	Former Head Assistant of the Sinai Development Authority
Anonymous	Personal interview, February 6, 2016 –Cairo, Egypt	A Former Governor of North Sinai and A Former Commander of the Egyptian Border Guards Force
Anonymous	Personal interview, March 13, 2016 - Cairo, Egypt)	A Former Deputy Head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate and the Political Advisor for the head of The Egyptian Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center
Anonymous Bedouin	Personal interview, February 4, 2016 –Giza, Egypt	A Bedouin teacher from Al-Sawarka tribe and a prominent member in a developmental NGO based in North Sinai
Anonymous Bedouin	Personal interview, February 4, 2016 –Giza, Egypt	A prominent member of AL-Sawarka tribe
Anonymous EX-Radical Islamist and Researcher specialized in the Islam Militant Movements	Personal interview- November 30, 2015– Giza, Egypt	Anonymous EX-Radical Islamist and Researcher specialized in the Islam Militant Movements, personal communication
Anonymous Political Researcher Specialized in Security Studies	Personal interview, February 3, 2016 - Cairo, Egypt	Anonymous political researcher specialized in security studies
Iman Ragb	Personal interview, December 1, 2015 - Cairo, Egypt)	Researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic studies
Khaled Dawoud	(Personal interview- December 1, 2015 - Cairo, Egypt)	Assistant Editor-in-Chief of Al-Ahram Weekly and official Spokesman of social-liberal Al-Dostour Party
Mohamed Salah	Personal interview, November 30, 2015 – Cairo, Egypt)	Head of Al-Hayat Newspaper Office in Cairo
Olfa Al-Salami	Personal interview - November 28, 2015 – Cairo, Egypt	Senior Journalist who Reported from and interviewed Bedouins and smugglers in North Sinai

Robert Springborg	Personal communication via Skype - February 8, 2016)	Professor of National Security at King's College and Sciences Po
Salah El-Din Hassan	Personal interview- November 30, 2015– Giza, Egypt	Researcher specialized in the Islam Militant Movements in Sinai
Sally Issac	Personal interview, December 8, 2015 - Giza, Egypt	Associate Professor of Political Science in Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University
Thabet Awaad	Personal interview- December 3, 2015– Giza, Egypt	Former Arish Resident in Al-Arish and Former Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Al-Ahram Newspaper
Youssef Werdany	Personal interview February 3, 2015–Cairo, Egypt	Deputy Minister of Youth and Specialist in Youth Radicalization
Zack Gold	Personal communication via Skype via Skype - December 2, 2015	Political Researcher Specialized in Security in the Sinai Peninsula