

2016

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### Recommended Citation

A. Elngar, Ahmed; A. ElDahshan, Kamal; Aboshosha, Ashraf; and K. Elsayed, Eman (2016) "Employing Multi-Level Authentication Protocol for Securing Intelligent Systems," *Information Sciences Letters*: Vol. 5 : Iss. 3 , Article 3.

Available at: <https://digitalcommons.aaru.edu.jo/isl/vol5/iss3/3>

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# Employing Multi-Level Authentication Protocol for Securing Intelligent Systems

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Received: 27 Jul. 2016, Revised: 16 Aug. 2016, Accepted: 26 Aug. 2016

Published online: 1 Sep. 2016

**Abstract:** Most authentication schemes are using passwords only to restrict access to services. Which are suffering from many weaknesses, such as key-logger attack and dictionary attack. Also, other authentication schemes are using physical token such as smart cards. These schemes are also impractical due to their infrastructure requirements. Since, many researchers have proposed a various of authentication schemes which rely on a single level security. So it is important to use multi-level security which is implemented especially in sensitive applications. This paper proposes an efficient multi-level user authentication protocol called "*EIDahshan Authentication protocol*" based on different authentication methods for each level. Where each level contains different authentication methods with its own privileges. These security levels are managed by an identity Manager. To validate the proposed protocol we applied it for user authentication on two web services such as Content Management System and Online Voting System.

**Keywords:** Authentication, Internet Security, Multi-Level Authentication, User Authentication

## Nomenclature

<i>EAP</i>	EIDahshan Authentication protocol
<i>IM</i>	Identity Manager
<i>CMS</i>	Content Management System
<i>OVS</i>	Online Voting System
<i>TBPA</i>	Text Based Passwords Authentication
<i>IPAuth</i>	Internet Protocol Authentication
<i>MMA</i>	Machine-Metrics Authentication
<i>MLA</i>	Multi-Level Authentication
<i>MCA</i>	Multi-Channel Authentication

## 1 Introduction

With the rapid progress of computing technologies, internet has become the most convenient environment for businesses, content management systems (*CMSs*) and online voting systems (*OVSs*) around the world [1]. Thus, internet security is a significant issue to keep the confidential information secret from being accessed by unauthenticated users [2]. Since, remote user authentication plays the most important service on the internet. It is the process of identifying an authorized

user, machine or any other entity, which requesting access for a particular web service on the internet under security constraints.[3].

Most authentication schemes are using text based passwords authentication *TBPA* only. Which are not secure enough for many applications that enforce security by access control mechanisms. Also, other authentication schemes are using smart cards to restrict services [4]. These schemes are also impractical due to their infrastructure requirements [5].

This paper proposes a security way regarding secure remote users authentication to the web service, by implementing Multi-Level Authentication (*MLA*) technique. *MLA* is simple enough, cost effective and does not need any additional hardware.

In this paper, the proposed EIDahshan Authentication protocol *EAP* makes the security measures of the remote user authentication more stringent. Where *EAP* is based on different authentication methods for each level; such as integrating text based passwords method with multi-channel authentication (*MCA*) method. Therefore, it helps to overcome many challenging attacks such as replay attack, DoS attack. Also, integrating text based passwords method with machine-metrics authentication

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(*MMA*) method at another level. It offers a strong protection against several attacks such as stolen or lost tokens attacks, phishing attacks and credential compromising attacks. Hence, the major goal of this paper is proposing a protocol for remote user authentication depending on *MLA*. So highly confidential data, use *MLA* is much more secure than traditional authentication schemes.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews related works. Section 3 it is devoted to a survey of some of the existing authentication methods such as; IP Authentication, Multi-Channel Authentication, Machine-Metrics Authentication, Multi-Level Authentication. Section 4 introduces the Proposed Multi-Level Authentication Protocol. Section 5 gives the implementation and Mathematical Security Analysis. Section introduces applicable two systems using Eldahshan authentication protocol. Finally, Section 7 contains the conclusion remarks.

## 2 Literature Survey

Authentication, confidentiality, anonymity, and non-repudiation are four of the main principles to access e-services. Most of research was concentrated on using multi factor authentication. Authors of [6], describe a general Multi-mode Authentication Framework *MAF* for applying organizational security policies, organized into distinct policy contexts known as echelons, among which a user may transition. The design of the framework allows various types of authentication technologies to be incorporated readily and provides a simple interface for supporting different types of policy enforcement mechanisms.

Another description of the *MLA* system described in [7,8]. The system is based on the security standard levels employed to transfer text and images through wide area networks. It provides several levels of security, which include digital signature, encryption, compression, and smart card technology. This scheme is impractical due to their infrastructure requirements and lack of encryption method.

In our protocol we concentrate on *MLA* technology; because it is an essential part in a voting/WCMS procedure. Since, GNU.FREE is a free Internet voting system released by the GNU project [9]. In GNU.FREE, voting is not done over the Web. Rather, a stand-alone Java program is used to cast votes which are encrypted using a cipher (BlowFish). The system does not provide sufficient security (beyond preventing regular eavesdropping), and it is easy for a malicious system to correlate voters and their votes.

A protocol in [10] also is designed without employing any cryptographic techniques. In this; voters would submit their vote along with a unique identification number to a validator who would then take their name off on a list of registered voters. Then the validator would

then strip off the Unique Identification number and submit just the votes to the tallier who would count the votes. Although this system has the advantages of being flexible, convenient and mobile, this system is far from secure. If the validator is compromised votes can be easily traced back to the voter or votes could be changed. Both privacy and accuracy lack with this protocol. There is no way to ensure the voter's privacy and the tallier accurately records the votes.

Given that CMS is a software application, it is prone to bugs just like any other program [11]. Vulnerabilities have been found in WCMS. As one example, a vulnerability called 'absolute path traversal vulnerability' was found in the open source product OpenCms in 2006. This flaw would allow remote authenticated users to download arbitrary files.

Another security concern lies with protection of authentication credentials when accessing CMS. Many CMS products are designed primarily to solve the content management problem of websites rather than building a secure product. Some WCMS products do not provide adequate protection for logins and passwords for example, and these passwords including the administrator password are sent as plain text over the network [12].

Similarly, as part of the publishing/uploading process, a CMS might use file transfer protocols such as *FTP* to transfer files from the CMS data storage server to the web server. *FTP* is not a secure protocol in the sense that authentication credentials and passwords are sent as plain text over the network. In addition, because publishing is an automatic process from the CMS to the production web server, *FTP* credentials might be hard coded in certain configuration files. Usually a hard-coded login password like this will not be changed regularly. As a result, any leakage of this password could allow someone illegally access to web content on the production web server [13].

## 3 An overview

There are various different authentication methods. This section presents a general overview of some of the available authentication methods. And how are these methods used to verify the authorized users of a web service on the internet.

### 3.1 IP Authentication (*IPAuth*)

One way to secure the connection between the server *S* and a legitimate user (*U*) is internet protocol authentication (*IPAuth*). Which restricting the access based on the IP address. Where, the server only accept addresses coming from specific addresses corporation *IP\**. Thus, the server considers any access excepted these specific addresses to suspect belong to malicious users [14].

### 3.2 Text based passwords Authentication (TBPA)

Passwords are the most commonly method used for user authentication. It plays an important role in daily life in various computing applications like *ATM* machines, internet services, windows login, authentication in mobiles etc. Which restricting unauthorized users to access the system [15].

### 3.3 Machine-Metrics Authentication (MMA)

Machine-metrics are metrics collected about a remote machine for the purpose of identification. Authors in [18] proposed a machine-metrics authentication protocol. The proposed protocol enhances the security of remote authentication depending on machine-metrics, instead of using the traditional smart card for remote user authentication. The proposed protocol is powerful, reliable, privacy-preserving and theft-proof. Hence, machine-metrics are hashed using *RC4-EA Hashing* function *RC4-EA Hashing* to guarantee high security and usability. Therefore, the data can not be easily retrievable without adequate authorization. Thus, the proposed authentication protocol is more convenient, because the burden of carrying a separate hardware token is removed. Moreover, this protocol helps to overcome many challenging attacks such as stolen or lost tokens attacks, phishing attacks and credential compromising attacks.

### 3.4 Multi-Channel Authentication (MCA)

Remote user authentication plays the most significant process to verify the authorized users of a web service on the Internet. Authors in [16] proposed "Multi-Channel User Authentication Protocol based on Encrypted Hidden OTP". Where, the protocol proposed an efficient one time password (OTP) based authentication over a multi-channels architecture. Which, applying the *RC4-EA* encryption method to encrypt the plain-OTP to cipher-OTP [17]. Then, Quick Response Code (QR) code is used as a data container to hide this cipher-OTP. Also, the purposed is integrating a web based application with mobile-based technology to communicate with the remote user over a multi-channels authentication architecture [16].

### 3.5 Multi-Level Authentication (MLA)

Multi-level Authentication (*MLA*) was developed by the *USA* military in the 1970 [19]. *MLA* is a technique used to Prevent users from accessing information with different sensitivities; for which they do not have authorization.

Also *MLA* is used in grid applications, where administrative can set multi-level policies on their applications. Which allow users to share some information with particular classes, while preventing a sensitive information from the others [19]. Hence, *MLA* is concerned with controlling the flow of information in systems. Therefore, *MLA* is one of ensuring that information at a high security levels cannot flow down to a lower security levels [20].

## 4 The Proposed EIDahshan Authentication Protocol

The major aim of the proposed "EIDahshan Authentication Protocol (*EAP*)" based on different authentication methods is securing the confidential information. The proposed protocol is enhancing user authentication protocol in [18]. Suppose that the protocol involves a set of different users  $U = \{u_1, u_2, \dots, u_n\}$ , so these users must work in different authentication levels  $L = \{l_1, l_2, \dots, l_m\}$ . The process of breaking the proposed protocol depends on the security classes as shown in Table 1.

**Table 1:** Notations of Security Classes

Authentication Class	Authentication Level
Low Security	$l_0$
Low Medium Security	$l_1$
Medium Security	$l_2$
High Security	$l_3$

Figure 1 illustrates the *EAP* architecture which consists of a server (*S*), a remote user ( $U_i$ ) and Identity Manager (*IM*) of the Web service. The communication between the (*S*), the ( $U_i$ ), and (*IM*) is based upon *HTTPS*. The *EAP* has three fundamental modules as shown in figure 1 which are:

1. Initialize setup module *ISM* is responsible of generate Random Nonce Codes.
2. User Registration and Generate Token Module *RTM* is responsible of handling the users' registration and request tokens.
3. Ticket Granting Module *TGM* is responsible of handling the users' authentication levels.

*EAP* consists of four phases : Preparation Phase, User enrollment phase, machine-metric enrollment phase, and authentication phase.

The notations employed throughout this protocol are shown in table 2.

#### 4.1 Preparation Phase

In this phase, *IM* enrolls  $U_i$  at *S* in order to use Enrollment Phase. *IM*,  $U_i$  and *S* executes the following




Fig. 1: Architecture of EAP

Table 2: Notations of EAP

Notation	Description
$U_i$	Remote User
$U_i^{id}$	User Identity
$U_i^{PW}$	User Password
$U_i^{IP}$	User IP Address
$U_i^{WIP}$	A White list of Allowed IP Addresses
ISM	Initialize setup module
RTM	User Registration and Generate Token Module
TGM	Ticket Granting Module
$U_i^{Prox}$	User Using Proxy
$U_i^{SSN}$	User Social Security Number
$U_i^{rn}$	Random Number
$U_i^{mob}$	User Mobile
$U_i^{em}$	User Electronic Mail
$S$	The Server
TK	Token
$h(\cdot)$	One Way Hash Function
$(E/D)_{RC4-EA}$	Encryption / Decryption Using RC4-EA Method
$(E/D)_{QR(\cdot)}$	Function that Encodes/Decodes Data into (QR) Code
$RC4-EA Hashing$	RC4-EA Hashing Function
$\parallel$	Concatenation
cc	confirmation code
$T$	Time Stamp
$r_1, r_2, r_3$	Random Nonce Generated by the Server
$T_c, T_{end}$	Time Created, Ended of Random Nonce
CSP	The Client Side Program
$V_i^{UHI}$	Hashing for Index the user
$D_i^{HMM}$	Hashing Machine-metrics
RNC	Random Nonce Code

steps:

1.  $IM$  enrolls user's a social security number  $U_i^{SSN}$  at  $S$  with status  $stat = 1$  and time created  $T_c$ .
2.  $IM$  assigns IP address  $U_i^{IP}$  to  $U_i$  (option).

3.  $IM$  assigns authentication levels  $l_m$  with the privileges  $p_s$  to  $U_i$ .
4.  $S$  examines the  $U_i^{SSN}$ . If it is invalid, then rejects it. Otherwise,  $S$  stores the values  $U_i^{SSN}$ ,  $stat$ , and  $T_c$  in its database.

$$S \rightarrow DB : \{U_i^{SSN}, U_i^{IP}, stat, T_c\} \quad (1)$$

### 4.2 User Enrollment Phase

In this phase,  $U_i$  enrolls at  $ISM$  and  $RTM$  modules in  $S$ , in order to use a service.  $U_i$  and  $S$  executes the following steps:

1.  $U_i$  enters his social security number  $U_i^{SSN}$  to open the enrollment phase.
2.  $RTM$  examine the  $U_i^{SSN}$ . If it is invalid, then rejects it. Otherwise, open the enrollment phase and change the value of  $stat$  from 1 to 0, then store the time expired  $T_{exp}$ .
3.  $U_i$  chooses an identity  $U_i^{id}$ , mobile number  $U_i^{mob}$ , electronic mail  $U_i^{em}$ , and password  $U_i^{PW}$ . Then computes  $X_i = h(U_i^{id} || U_i^{PW})$ . Then sends  $\{U_i^{id}, U_i^{mob}, U_i^{em}, X_i, T_1\}$  to  $S$  via a secure channel.

$$U \rightarrow RTM : \{U_i^{id}, U_i^{mob}, U_i^{em}, X_i, T_1\} \quad (2)$$

4.  $ISM$  module generate random nonce  $U_i^{rn}$ .
5.  $RTM$  modules examine the time stamp  $T_1$ . If it is invalid, then rejects it. Otherwise, checks whether  $U_i^{id}, U_i^{mob}, U_i^{em}$ , is available for use. If it is,  $RTM$  computes  $Y_i = h(X_i || U_i^{rn})$ . Finally,  $RTM$  stores the values  $U_i^{id}, U_i^{mob}, U_i^{em}, U_i^{rn}$ , and  $Y_i$  with  $U_i^{SSN}$  in its database.

$$RTM \rightarrow DB : \{U_i^{id}, U_i^{em}, Y_i, U_i^{rn}, U_i^{mob}\} \quad (3)$$

6.  $ISM$  generate random Token  $TK$ , then  $RTM$  sends  $TK$  to  $U_i$  via  $U_i^{em}/U_i^{mob}$ .

$$RTM \rightarrow U_i : \{TK\} \quad (4)$$

7. Finally,  $RTM$  stores the values  $TK$  in its database.

$$RTM \rightarrow DB : \{TK\} \quad (5)$$

### 4.3 Machine-metrics Enrollment Phase

In this phase, the physical metrics of a machine are collected to be used as the identification of the machine. Suppose the physical metrics space is  $C$  which consists of  $n$  metrics;  $C = \{metr_1, metr_2, \dots, metr_n\}$ . The  $CSP$  will returns  $metr_i \in C, (i = 1, 2, \dots, g)$ .  $U_i, S$  and  $CSP$  execute the following steps:

1. After  $U_i$  received his  $TK$  from  $RTM$  via  $U_i^{em}/U_i^{mob}$ ..
2.  $U_i$  enters his  $TK$  to  $CSP$  to enroll his machine.
3.  $CSP$  reads  $metr_1, metr_2 \in C$ . Then computes:  
 $V_i^{UHI} = RC4 - EA \text{ Hashing}(metr_1||metr_2)$ . Then stores the value  $V_i^{UHI}$  in  $DB$ .

$$CSP \rightarrow DB : \{V_i^{UHI}\} \quad (6)$$

4.  $CSP$  uses  $TK$  as a secret seed for  $RC4 - EA \text{ Hashing}$ , then computes:

$$D_i^{HMM} = RC4 - EA \text{ Hashing}_{TK}(metr_1||metr_2||...||metr_g)$$

5. Finally,  $CSP$  stores the values  $D_i^{HMM}$  in a remote database  $DB$ .

$$CSP \rightarrow DB : \{D_i^{HMM}\} \quad (7)$$

#### 4.4 Authentication Phase

After  $U_i$  has a successful enrollment,  $TGM$  in  $S$  wants to authenticate  $U_i$  upon his authentication level  $l_m$  with the privileges  $p_s$  granted by  $IM$ . This phase is evaluated by multiple levels authentications:

##### -User's Authenticated at $l_0$

( $IPAuth$ ) is a protocol suite for securing internet communications by authenticating each  $IP$  packet of a communication session.  $IPAuth$  takes place between two parties of a  $TGM$  in  $S$  and a user  $U_i$ . Which considered as preliminary authentication level  $l_0$  to authenticate  $U_i$ . If the  $U_i$  passes this level  $l_0$ , then he assigns to next authentication level with grants privilege. Otherwise he blocked. The various steps of ( $IPAuth$ ) will be explain below:

1. Assume that  $U_i$  requests  $TGM$  to join the web service.
2.  $TGM$  checks  $U_i^{Prox}$  :  
 If  $U_i$  access the web service using proxy.  
 then  $TGM$  block the  $U_i$  connection
3. The  $TGM$  gets  $U_i^{IP}$
4. The  $TGM$  checks the white list of IP addresses  
 if ( $U_i^{IP} == U_i^{WIP}$ ).  
 then  $U_i$  assigns to next authentication level  
 else  
 Reject connection and block

##### -User's Authenticated at $l_1$

After  $U_i$  has a successful passes level  $l_0$ , User's at this level must be examined by password authentication Technique to grant his privilege. The authentication at this level is shown in the following steps:

1.  $U_i$  enters his  $U_i^{id}$  and  $U_i^{PW}$ , and computes  
 $X'_i = h(U_i^{id}||U_i^{PW})$ , then send  $U_i^{id}, X'_i, T_2$  to  $TGM$ .

$$U \rightarrow TGM : \{U_i^{id}, X'_i, T_2\} \quad (8)$$

2.  $TGM$  examines the time stamp  $T_2$ . If it is invalid, then rejects it. Otherwise,  $S$  computes  
 $Y'_i = h(X'_i||U_i^m)$ , then checks whether  $U_i^{id}$  is valid and  $Y'_i == Y_i$ . If it is, user authentic at this level and use his privilege. Otherwise,  $S$  ask  $U_i$  a maximum 3 attempts to provide his correct  $U_i^{id}$  and  $U_i^{PW}$ .

If  $U_i$  exceeds this threshold, then  $S$  considers  $U_i$  as an attack and block his account.

##### -User's Authenticated at $l_2$

After  $U_i$  has a successful passes level  $l_0$ . User's at this level must be examined by password authentication Technique. Additionally will face another authentication technique such as  $MMA$  to grant his privilege.

After  $U_i$  has a successful Machine-metrics Enrollment. Now  $TGM$  wants to authenticate the machine upon  $CSP$ . The machine-metrics authentication process is shown in the following steps:

1.  $CSP$  reads  $metr_1, metr_2 \in C$ . Then computes:  
 $V_i^{UHI'} = RC4 - EA \text{ Hashing}(metr_1||metr_2)$ .
2.  $CSP$  checks whether  $V_i^{UHI'} == V_i^{UHI}$ . If it is, then  $CSP$  gets the  $TK$ .
3.  $CSP$  computes:

$$D_i^{HMM'} = RC4 - EA \text{ Hashing}_{TK}(metr_1||metr_2||...||metr_g)$$

using  $TK$  as a secret seed.

4.  $CSP$  checks whether  $D_i^{HMM'} == D_i^{HMM}$ . If it is, then  $CSP$  generates  $RNC$  to  $U_i$  with the  $status = 1$  using  $RNGCryptoServiceProvider$ , which gives an unguessable crypto strength seed. Hence, it gives the random object with a different crypto strength number each time. Which mean is that, it will go on to return a different random number for each call. Then  $CSP$  stores the values  $RNC$  in  $DB$ .

$$CSP \rightarrow DB : \{RNC\} \quad (9)$$

5.  $U_i$  sent  $RNC$  to  $TGM$  via web application.
6. Finally,  $TGM$  checks whether  $RNC$  is invalid or not match with user credentials at the  $DB$  then, "request is rejected". Otherwise, user's machine is authentic at this level with his privilege and convert  $RNC$  status to 0.

##### -User's Authenticated at $l_3$

After  $U_i$  has a successful passes level  $l_0$ , User's at this level must be examined by password authentication

Technique, and *MMA*. Also faces another authentication Technique such as *MCA* to grant his privilege. where, *MCA* composed of two Technique *OTQR* and *OTP*. The authentication at this level is shown in the following steps:

**Authentication by Email:**

1. *ISM* generates a random nonce  $r_1$  to *TGM*. Then *TGM* computes  $Z_i = E_{RC4-EA}(r_1)$ , then computes  $A_i = (E)_{QR}(Z)$ . Also *S* generates a confirmation code *cc*. Finally, *TGM* stores  $A_i, cc, T_c, T_{end}$ , where  $A_i$  is *OTQR*.

$$TGM \rightarrow DB : \{A_i, cc, T_c, T_{end}\} \quad (10)$$

2. *TGM* sends  $A_i, cc, T_3$  to  $U_i$  via mail channel.
3.  $U_i$  examines the *cc* which is an identification code for this mail,  $U_i$  should match with *cc* displayed on the screen; if matched, then the *OTQR* sent in this mail is the *OTQR* to be entered on the screen. Otherwise this mail is created by an attacker.
4.  $U_i$  examines the time stamp  $T_3$ . If it is valid,  $U_i$  send  $A'_i, T'_3$  to *TGM*.
5. *TGM* checks whether  $T_c \leq T'_3 \leq T_{end}$  and  $A'_i == A_i$ . If it is, then user is authentic. Otherwise, not authentic user.

**Authentication by Mobile:**

1. *ISM* generates a random nonce  $r_2$  to *TGM*. Then *TGM* computes  $F_i = h(r_2)$ . Finally, *TGM* stores  $F_i, T_c, T_{end}$ , where  $F_i$  is *OTP*.

$$TGM \rightarrow DB : \{F_i, T_c, T_{end}\} \quad (11)$$

2. *TGM* sends  $r_2, T_4$  to  $U_i$  via mobile channel, then discards  $r_2$ .
3.  $U_i$  examines the time stamp  $T_4$ . If it is valid,  $U_i$  enters  $r_2$ , then computes  $F'_i = h(r_2)$  and sends  $F'_i, T'_4$  to *TGM*.
4. *TGM* checks whether  $T_c \leq T'_4 \leq T_{end}$  and  $F'_i == F_i$  is valid. If it is, then user authentic. Otherwise, not authentic user.

Now If  $U_i^{PW}, OTQR$  and *OTP* holds, then *TGM* in *S* is convinced that user  $U_i$  is authentic at this level with his privilege. Otherwise, *TGM* asks  $U_i$  a maximum 3 attempts to provide his correct  $U_i^{PW}$ . If  $U_i$  exceeds this threshold, then *S* considers  $U_i$  as an attack and block his account.

After  $U_i$  has a successful passes his authentication levels in order to use a service and grants his privilege.  $U_i$ , *EAP* and web service execute the following steps as shown in figure 1:

1. *EAP* generates a random nonce  $r_3$  (packet key) as a combination of user credentials to the web service.

2. The web service send a random nonce  $r_3$  to  $U_i$  via secure channel.
3.  $U_i$  encrypts his contents using  $r_3$ . Then sends it to the application.
4. The web service decrypts the contents then sent to database.

**5 Implementation and Security Analysis**

The proposed *EAP* based on different authentication methods is securing a sensitive information.

The performance of the proposed authentication protocol is tested using server 32 core AMD opteron processor 6376 with 32 GB of RAM and 4 RAID 1s, laptop (Intel i5, 1.80 GHz processor, 2 GB RAM) and simple mobile phone. The experiments have been implemented using PHP-MySql and C-sharp language environment.

**5.1 Implementation**

The proposed *EAP* is integrating a different authentication methods at each level to grant  $U_i$  his privilege, which makes it more secure than the general authentication protocols. Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 show some of results, especially the examining users at  $l_0$  by using the (*IPAuth*) authentication method. Also, the result shows the transition of users from  $l_0$  to  $l_1$  and the transition from  $l_0$  to  $l_2$  finally, the transition from  $l_0$  to  $l_3$ . These results are obtained by using the proposed protocol and they include different experimental results for selected users in different security levels and a limited numbers of user's trials.

**Table 3:** First : Examining Users at  $l_0$  The Authentication method : (*IPAuth*), The Results ( $F = Fail, P = Pass$ )

U's	Result of ( <i>IPAuth</i> )	Trial	Decision
$u_1$	F	1	Second Trial
$u_2$	P	1	Pass $l_0$
$u_3$	F	2	Third trial
$u_4$	F	3	Reject
$u_5$	P	3	Pass $l_0$

**Table 4:** Second : Transition from  $l_0$  to  $l_1$ , The Results ( $F = Fail, P = Pass$ )

U's	Auth Method		Res	Trial	privilege
	( <i>IPAuth</i> )	Pass			
$u_1$	P	F	F	1	Second Trial
$u_2$	P	P	P	1	R
$u_3$	F	-	F	2	Third Trial
$u_4$	P	P	P	3	R
$u_5$	P	F	F	3	Reject

**Table 5:** Third : Transition from  $l_0$  to  $l_2$ , The Results ( $F = Fail, P = Pass$ )

U's	Auth Method			Res	Trial	privilege
	(IPAuth)	Pass	MCA			
$u_1$	P	P	P	P	1	R/I
$u_2$	P	F	—	F	1	Second Trial
$u_3$	P	P	F	F	2	Third Trial
$u_4$	F	—	—	F	3	Reject
$u_5$	P	P	P	P	3	R/I

**Table 6:** Forth : Transition from  $l_0$  to  $l_3$ , The Results ( $F = Fail, P = Pass$ )

U's	Auth Method				Res	Trial	privilege
	(IPAuth)	Pass	MCA	MM			
$u_1$	P	P	P	P	P	1	Full Access
$u_2$	P	F	—	—	F	1	Second Trial
$u_3$	P	P	P	F	F	2	Third Trial
$u_4$	F	—	—	—	F	3	Reject
$u_5$	P	P	P	P	P	3	Full Access

### 5.2 Mathematical Security Analysis

The security of the proposed protocol is analyzed under the probability of cracking its levels. It consists of  $m$  levels, where Multi authentication methods  $auth_k$  are applied at each level for security purposes. I.e.  $AUth = \{auth_1\}$  form the authentication for level  $l_0$ , and  $AUth = \{auth_2, auth_3, auth_4\}$  together form the authentication for level  $l_3$ . Therefore, to access privileges available at level  $l_3$ , the expected authentication will be  $AUth = \{auth_1, auth_2, auth_3, auth_4\}$ .

Let  $eve$  be the event of cracking the protocol levels. The event can either be a success or a failure. Let  $prob$  be the probability of success at each level. So in order to crack the proposed protocol levels,  $eve$  initially needs to crack the preliminary level  $l_0$  and then Level  $l_b$  where,  $b = 1, 2, \dots, m$ . Therefore, the probability of cracking Level  $b$  successfully is  $P(eve) = Prob^{auth_k}$ . Assuming  $Prob = 0.1$ , the possibility of successfully cracking  $l_3$  will be 0.0001. Hence the probability of completely cracking the proposed is very less than the traditional authentication schemes.

### 5.3 Computational Complexity

The performance comparison of several password authentication schemes and our protocol are listed in Table 8. Where,  $T_E$  denotes the computation complexity of exponential operation.  $T_s$  denotes the computation complexity of symmetric encryption/decryption operation.  $T_H$  denotes the computation complexity of cryptographic hash operation.  $T_{dh}$  denotes the computation complexity of data hide into (QR) Code.

Note that, in our protocol, the computation complexity does not include the authentication steps for the user to validate the server. It is shown that our scheme uses less computational resources than others, thus our protocol is more suitable to be used in most online services. Furthermore, our protocol also provides mutual authentication which is important on ensuring the security of remote authentication protocols.

## 6 Applicable Web Services Using EIDahshan Authentication Protocol

To analyze the performance of EIDahshan proposed authentication protocol, a performance comparison between two applicable web services using the protocol is conducting. EIDahshan authentication protocol is configured based on what is common and what is dependent on the problem nature. The experiments of the two web services are evaluated in order to keep authorized users and there data in high confidential authentication levels.

### Case Study 1: Content Management System (CMS)

A content management system (CMS) is a web service that facilitates a group of users, usually from different departments in an enterprise, to collaboratively maintain and organize the content of a website in an effective manner.

More enterprises are creating CMS that are personalized through the process of authentication and authorization. Hence, a specific series of contents is made available to a site users once they identify themselves through a pre-set of authentication methods. To that extent it is vital that the enterprise's CMS integrate with the authentication system in a suitable manner such that appropriate content is presented to the user after they have been authenticated. Specifically a user should only see what they are authorized to see. Furthermore, under no circumstances should that web user be presented with any content that they are NOT authorized to see.

### Case Study 2: Online Voting System (OVS)


Online voting system OVS is a significant tool. Which to allow voters to vote over the internet without the geographical restrictions with considers important criteria in evaluating OVSs such as the democracy, mobility, and privacy.

OVS is a practicable alternative on account of the swift computer network and the benefits from cryptographic and hidden information techniques. The main aim of a secure OVS is to ensure the privacy of the voters and the accuracy of votes.

The full process of integrating EIDahshan authentication protocol to protect gated content/vote need



not be difficult for use today. The authentication process ensures that the right content gets delivered to the right user at the right time. It is a very scalable process to ensure the safety and confidentiality of the content as shown in figure 2 .



**Fig. 2:** Full process diagram depicting the integration between ELDahshan authentication protocol and the Web Service

The configuration of proposed ELDahshan authentication protocol which employed on the two web services *CMS/OVS* as shown in table 7

**Table 7:** The configuration of ELDahshan Authentication Protocol

ELDahshan Protocol	CMS	OVS
<i>IPAuth</i>	✓	✗
<i>Password</i>	✓	✓
<i>Multi Channel</i>	✓(option)	✓(option)
<i>Machin Metric</i>	✓	✗
<i>Multi Level</i>	✓	✓

**Table 8:** Comparison of Computational Complexity of Several Schemes and Our Protocol.

	Hwang [21]	Awas [22]	Ramas [23]	Ours
Enroll	$1T_E$	$1T_H + 1T_E$	$1T_E$	$2T_H$
Auth $l_1$	$1T_H + 3T_E$	$2T_H + 3T_E$	$1T_H + 2T_E$	$2T_H$
Auth $l_2$	$1T_H + 3T_E$	$1T_H + 3T_E$	$2T_H + 3T_E$	$1T_S + 1T_{Auth} + 1T_H + Auth\ l_1$
Auth $l_3$	-	-	-	$2T_S + 4T_H + Auth\ l_1$
Mut-Auth	NO	NO	NO	Yes

## 7 Conclusions

The main contribution of this paper, is proposing ELDahshan authentication protocol. The proposed protocol enhances the security of a remote user authentication; by using different authentication methods for each level. Therefore, users at one level are granted certain privileges according to that level. Since, the sensitive information can not be easily retrievable without adequate authorization. Therefore, in order to examine user honesty in this sensitive proposed, an identity manager whose responsible to apply more sophisticated authenticated methods for each level. Thus, user should successfully across these methods in order to got his privileges. However, this protocol ensures that information at high authentication level cannot flow down to lower authentication level. Thus, ELDahshan authentication protocol is much more secure than traditional authentication schemes. ELDahshan proposed authentication protocol is applied for users authentication in two web services such as content management system (CMS) and online voting system (OVS), to keep there data in high confidential authentication levels.

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