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Determinants of foreign policy in Turkish-Greek relations

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Abstract
The Turkish-Greek relations are thorny relations, dominated by military intervention on some occasions and the threat of the use of military force at other times. This study came to analyze the principles of both Turkey and Greek foreign policy, shed light on the most important factors that limit Turkish-Greek relations, and present three scenarios for the future of Turkish-Greek relations. To achieve these objectives, the study used a decision-making approach and revealed that Turkish-Greek relations are determined by various contentious issues represented by the dispute in the Aegean Sea, the dispute over the island of Cyprus, the dispute over the continental shelf, the refusal to recognize the Turkish minority in Greece, Athens’ harboring of Turkish and Kurdish opponents wanted by the Turkish government, exploratory talks, Greece’s strategy in dealing with Turkey, and the exploration for natural resources in the Mediterranean. In light of the determinants of Turkish-Greek relations, the study proposed three Scenarios for the future of that bilateral relation: The first scenario is to maintain the status quo, the second scenario is to improve Turkish-Greek relations, the third scenario is to worsen Turkish-Greek relations. These scenarios are subject to their occurrence in light of developments on the ground.

Keywords: Regional power, Turkish foreign policy, Greek foreign policy, Turkish-Greek relations.
Introduction

Turkey is located both in Europe and in Asia, a trait shared only with Russia. Geographically, it is a Balkan, Black Sea and Mediterranean state. The Balkan and Black Sea regions are vital for strategic relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus, especially through its ethnic, religious and cultural ties. While Turkey is a Middle Eastern country, considering its historical ties to the region, it is also a bridge between the Middle East and Europe as well as Central Asia. Accordingly, the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles) carry significant strategic importance. Its location in the tumultuous Middle Eastern region creates significant security concerns. It is interesting to note that Turkey is the only Muslim country with a democratic political system based upon secular principles. Although Turkey is mainly a Middle Eastern country (97% of its land is located in Asia), it has been actively seeking membership in the European Union and its predecessors for the past forty years (Belge, 2004).

Its geopolitical potential places Turkey, once again, at a focal point in light of the recent power struggle in the region. Turkey is also becoming an important alternative for energy routes. Western concerns arose due to European dependence on Russian-controlled energy (Mahli, 2016). With its historic stand in the region, Turkey is bound to play a crucial role in international relations. While external factors have become more influential in Turkish foreign policy, this time, domestic factors (especially ethnicity and religion) cannot be ignored.

Greek foreign policy is designed to serve the national interest. In today’s globalized environment, this means that foreign policy must be developed across a broad spectrum, from traditional diplomacy and the cultivation of Greece’s bilateral relations to our country’s participation in the European Union and other international organizations. Our country has its own perspective and develops initiatives concerning all major global issues. In this section, you will also find presentations of our national positions on major priority issues in our foreign.

Greece occupies a geostategic position at the foot of the Balkan Peninsula – where the process of European integration is still underway – at the maritime crossroads of the Eastern Mediterranean, which is the most ancient bridge of commercial and intellectual communication with the Middle East. Greece is developing and implementing a cohesive regional policy, the ultimate goal of which is to consolidate peace and security, and spread prosperity, throughout our immediate neighborhood (Yossi, 2014). In fact, in the 1990s many of the old tendencies and reflexes that characterized Greece’s Middle East policy in the 1980s were still strong. A good example was Greece’s prevarication over the development of relations with Israel even after the establishment of full bilateral diplomatic relations (Dipono, 1979).

Greek foreign policy in the post-Cold War era retains the fundamental principles that have shaped our country’s destiny. In a nutshell, the foreign policy of Greece is geared to defend and promote our national interests in the context of our alliances and commitments, to seek peace and stability in the region, and to assist the global community in its efforts to alleviate pain, end hunger, reaffirm the rule of law, and deal with the causes and the occurrence of violence.

In a critical corner of the globe, Greece has long experience and painful memories of war and violence and is fully prepared to use that experience toward creating a peaceful world.

In a very real sense, the scope of involvement of Greek foreign policy in the Middle East has been relatively limited over the past thirty-five years, in spite of Greece’s proximity to this area of strategic significance. It is true that during most of this period, Greece consistently maintained — or in some cases sought to cultivate — good relations with many Arab countries as well as with the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. As noted above, since the late 1990s Athens has also steadily improved relations with Israel, although bilateral relations still lack warmth. The flirtation with the ‘radical’ Arab regimes by Papandreou’s governments was no exception to this rule. In short, at no point did Athens have a long-standing substantial relation with any Arab state.

Purpose of the study

The contentious relations between Greece and Turkey have always been a concern. The two countries have long been at odds over the boundaries of the Aegean Sea’s territorial waters, ownership of certain small islands, and control over Aegean airspace. The fact that Greece and Turkey almost went to war recently over rival claims to an Aegean islet indicates the level of tension simmering just below the surface.

Relations between Greece and Turkey have always been a significant priority for U.S. foreign policy. Though both have long been American allies, these two Aegean countries have been locked in a posture of mutual hostility for much of their histories. Both Greeks and Turks
are convinced of the other’s unjustifiable behavior and ill will, and their national pride encourages them to counter and outdo any action or statement of the other. More than their own futures, however, is bound up in the conflicts dividing them; the peace and security of the entire southern periphery of Europe is also affected.

The fact that even today, in 1996, Greece and Turkey almost went to war in the Aegean underscores the importance of taking active steps to resolve the differences between them. With the sense of new possibilities, and in keeping with the mandate of the United States Institute of Peace to promote peaceful resolution of international conflict, the Institute held a seminar on June 12, 1996, to examine the future of Greek-Turkish relations and steps toward resolution. The meeting was chaired by Chester A. Crocker, chairman of the Institute’s Board of Directors, former assistant secretary of state, and study professor of diplomacy at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service (Ker-Lindsey, 2016). The focus was threefold: examination of bilateral relations and issues first from a Turkish and then from a Greek perspective, prospects for reconciliation on specifically the Aegean and Cyprus issues, and ways in which U.S. policy can promote the resolution of the disputes between these two technically allied countries.

Greece and Turkey have rarely enjoyed good relations, and current tensions are fueled by historical grievances. Nevertheless, there was a brief period of cooperation between World Wars I and II. After the consolidation of Turkey’s independence, Greece under President Venizelos and Turkey under Atatürk negotiated population transfers and property issues in an agreement that was further solidified with the signing of the Friendship Treaty in 1930. The treaty guaranteed the inviolability of their borders, marking what is considered the high point in Greek-Turkish relations.

The situation soured at the time of World War II, however, when Greece became angered over Turkey’s refusal to enter the conflict on the allied side, opting instead to remain neutral. Relations went downhill from there and have yet to recover. Of the many issues that currently divide the two countries, the two most antagonistic and intractable are the Cyprus and Aegean disputes. Regarding the latter, Turkey and Greece share the same continental shelf; Greece claims that its islands have their own shelf, whereas Turkey insists that because that shelf is shared with its mainland, the Aegean islands should have their own special characteristics.

The boundaries of territorial waters are also under contention, and the discovery of oil in the Aegean in 1973 exacerbated the dispute. The matter flared up to the brink of war when the Turks began oil exploration a few years later, though the situation calmed when it became clear that neither side actually wished to go to war. The issue seethed yet again in early 1996, when the two countries almost came to blows because of a territorial dispute over an Aegean islet that the Greeks call Imia and the Turks Kardak. Though each country determinedly displayed its military strength, the United States managed to diffuse the tensions between them through frantic diplomacy. Nevertheless, Imia/Kardak is only one of many disputed islets in the Aegean. Control over Aegean airspace is also disputed, though the matter of civil aviation flights seems to have been resolved. Military flights, however, continue to cause friction (Vathakou, 2010).

Objectives of the study

This study aimed to:
- Recognize the principles of the Turkish foreign policy and its history.
- Recognize the principles of the Greek foreign policy and its history.
- Shed light on the most important factors that limit the Turkish-Greek relations.
- Anticipating the future of Turkish-Greek relations.

Questions of the study

This study tried to answer the following questions:
- What are the principles of the Turkish foreign policy?
- What are the principles of the Greek foreign policy?
- What are the most important factors that limit the Turkish-Greek relations?
- What is the future of Turkish-Greek relations?

Hypotheses of the study

The study assumed that there are many outstanding issues determines the development of Turkish-Greece relations.

Significance of the study

The significance of this study was determined because of the following functions:
- This study helps in the determination of the principles of Turkish foreign policy.
- This study helps to recognize the principles of the Greek foreign policy.
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- This study refers to the most important factors that limit the Turkish-Greek relations.
- This study proposes three scenarios to the future of Turkish-Greek relations.

Methodology

The study is based on foreign policy decision-making theory that focuses on the decision-making process as a basis for interpreting foreign policy by understanding how the decision was made and why, and the influences of the international system that reflected on it, as through external decisions, the trends of the state emerge, achieve its interests and defend its interests towards the parties of regional and international system. The importance of decision-making theory lies in how to change the goals and make the system ready to respond in light of the changing surrounding environment.

Study structure:

1- The principles of the Turkish foreign policy.
2- The principles of the Greek foreign policy.
3- Determinants of Turkish-Greek relations.
4- Future of Turkish-Greek relations.

1- The principles of the Turkish foreign policy

Turkey has gained great importance; due to its geographical location between the continents of Asia and Europe, whether among the countries of the Middle East, among European countries, or the countries of the Caucasus and Balkans, in addition to Turkey's ability to employ a group of other components that it possesses, which led to its rise as an effective regional power. These components are:

A- Geographical location, as Turkey is located in the middle of (3) regions, namely the Balkan countries in the northwest, the Caucasus countries in the northeast, and the countries of the Middle East region in the south (Nur al-Din,1998: 44).

B- Turkey oversees several seas, namely the Mediterranean Sea, the Aegean Sea, the Marwoman Sea and the Black Sea, and it controls the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits that separate the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (Nofal,1993: 21).

C- Turkey occupies the 19th place in terms of population, this huge manpower has qualified Turkey to play an important role in various fields, as Turkey is a young country compared to the peoples in Europe, and at the same time Turkey’s population census constitutes an element of balance with the nearby regional environment From Iran, the Arab region and Europe, which gives it a wide area of influence in each of these regions (Abdel-ati,2009:20).

D- Although Turkey is a non-oil country, but it almost monopolizes the two most important resources in the Middle East, namely water and food, which future studies expect will cause international conflicts to control them in light of their scarcity due to the decreasing water level, and the lack of food sufficiency in light of the growing Population, shrinking agricultural land (Bakir,2009:23). Turkey is classified among the emerging markets that are characterized by a dynamic and diversified economy, in addition to its success in reducing the unemployment rate to (9.1%), which raised its value to take its place among the best European countries in terms of low unemployment (Al-Sharqawi,2009:85). The Turkish government is one of the most successful governments in managing the repercussions of the global economic crisis, as the Turkish economy maintained its strength and capabilities in light of the global economic crisis, and grew by more than (11%) until Turkey became the largest country in terms of economic growth rates in Europe, and the second after China at the level of the Group of Twenty (Abdel-Qader,2012).

E- The Turkish Armed Forces is the second largest armed force in NATO after the US Armed Forces. Turkey is one of the five NATO member states in the alliance's nuclear sharing policy, along with Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Incirlik Air Base hosts (90) B61 nuclear bombs, 40 of which are designated for use by the Turkish Air Force (Abdel-Qader,2012).

2- The principles of Turkish foreign policy

Turkey is one of the states that enjoys an abundance of strategic options; Because of the extension of its strategic depth in many neighboring regions, which forced it to be an active member in many regional systems, and to achieve this, Turkey followed an intellectual methodology and a strategic dimension aimed at re-positioning it on the map of the Middle East and its geographical neighbors, not only as a regional power, but As the main player owns the keys and threads of the game.

Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took over the reins of power in Turkey in

1 The Justice and Development Party was established in (2001) under the slogan (working for Turkey and attracting all segments of society) after its founders split from the Islamic Virtue Party, which was dissolved by a decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court. The number of founding party members reached 63, headed by Reccep Tayyip Erdogan, the first leader of the party was elected. The party affirms that it represents the moderate Islamic wing in Turkey, that it respects religious and intellectual freedoms, that it is open to the world and bases its policies on tolerance and dialogue. The party
2002, a fundamental change has taken place in Turkish foreign policy starting from a number of foreign policy principles on which Turkey relied, that were framed by Ahmed Davutoğlu including and adopted by the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) since it took power in Turkey in 2002. These principles are summarized in the following points (Til & Mansurbeg, 2014:113-115):

1. **Strategic depth**: a concept first proposed by former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. This concept relies on building Turkish foreign policy on the geopolitical dimension, and the Turkish cultural, social, economic and historical extension, which helps in transferring Turkey to the circle of direct regional and international influence in various Global issues, as the basic premise of Turkish foreign policy is that closer relations with a number of “key states” in the regions surrounding Turkey constitute a fundamental basis for consolidating relations with the rest of the regional powers in these regions.

2. **Soft power**: by adopting the elements of diplomacy, trade and economic exchange, and intellectual communication, which is considered to have a deeper impact and more usefulness than hard power, but this does not prevent the development of a hard (military) deterrent force that preserves and defends sovereignty, national security and higher Turkish interests. Turkey uses soft power as a tool in its foreign policy, based on the declaration of its leaders that Turkey's regional goal is to achieve security and stability, and that achieving this goal requires building the foundations of regional cooperation, developing solutions to conflicts in the region, and creating regional institutions such as those that have effectively contributed to resolving European differences after cold War.

3. **Proactive diplomacy**: Turkish diplomacy anticipates upcoming crises and offers solutions to them before they develop.

4. **Humanitarian diplomacy**: According to this principle, Turkish foreign policy must be based on humanitarian foundations. Therefore, Turkey will intervene and take care of various crises with humanitarian dimensions in its regional geographical scope and in the international field as well.

5. **Zeroing problems**, which is Turkey's attempt not to be a party to regional disputes and disagreements, and its attempt to resolve these disputes through its diplomatic apparatus.

6. **Adopting a multi-dimensional foreign policy**, as it is not possible to follow a one-dimensional policy, and instead of Turkey being an exporter of problems, it is an exporter of solutions to problems, and a state that contributes to the establishment of global and regional peace.

7. **Participation as an active member in all international institutions**, and hosting many conferences held by international organizations.

8. **Building a solid network of relations** in all vital political, economic and cultural fields, laying foundations for revitalizing bilateral relations between Turkey and neighboring states, and developing mechanisms to make borders linking factors and not separating neighboring peoples.

Turkey also has strengthened its political and economic relations with the countries of the Middle East, Central Asian and African countries through its membership in organizations such as the Council of Turkey, the Joint Administration of Turkish Arts and Culture, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Economic Cooperation Organization, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Regional Development Organization. Observer member status in the League of Arab States.

The Justice and Development Party's assumption of power in Turkey in 2002 has contributed to strengthening Turkey's regional role and giving it local, regional and international fame thanks to the party's great political and economic successes that contributed to bringing Turkey to high ranks at the international level (Dalacoura, 2017).

As for the **Turkey Foreign Policy**

**Strengths**, it can be summarized as follows:

2- The principles of the Greek foreign policy

Greece's foreign policy is generally aligned with that of its EU partners. Greece maintains full diplomatic, political, and economic relations with its Southeast European neighbors, except with the Republic of Macedonia, and regards itself as a leader of

also stresses that it does not oppose secularism, and that it will work hard for Turkey to become a member of the European Union.
the region’s Euro-Atlantic integration process. It provided peacekeeping contingents for Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Prominent issues in Greek foreign policy include Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean, illegal migration, Turkish accession to the EU, Balkan integration and the name dispute with Macedonia, the reunification of Cyprus, and Greek-American relations.

Greece is located in southeastern Europe in the far south of the Balkan Peninsula, bordered to the north by Macedonia and Bulgaria, to the east by Turkey and the Aegean Sea, to the south by the Mediterranean Sea, to the west by the Mediterranean Sea and Albania (Borza, 1992). The area of Greece is about 130,000 square kilometers (Engels, 2010), and Greece is distinguished by its natural resources such as Oil, natural gas, iron ore, bauxite, lead, zinc, nickel (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002), in addition to the tourism industry, Tobacco, and Chemicals.

The Greek economy is well developed, and the quality of life and standard of living are very high, the Greek economy is the largest in the Balkans, where it is an important regional investor. Greece, a founding member of the United Nations, is the tenth member to join the European Communities and has been part of the Eurozone since 2001. It is also a member of many other international institutions, including the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an organization Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Trade Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the International Organization of la Francophonie (Engels, 2010).

For an EU member state like Greece, the national interest is thus intertwined with the European Union’s interest and its definition as a soft power and as global power as interpreted in the Union’s European Security Strategy of December 2003 (Tsakonas, & Tourkiniotis, 2003) and its Global Strategy of June 2016. Yet for crisis-wracked Greece, the national interest verges on the national sentiment, which at times leans closer to exceptionalism rather than the pursuit of greater integration, and by extension, influence within the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance. In fact, a mitigating factor is the country’s geography, which has enhanced the notion of the country being a flank state, on the margins of all the integrative processes in Europe and the West. This perception has not changed in the post-Cold War era as the migration crisis emanating in part from the Syrian conflict acts as a reminder of the country being a bulwark. The continued toil in maintaining non-conflictual relations with NATO ally and neighbor Turkey has not helped either in changing the dichotomic interpretation of the country’s identity and by extension, its national interest. Does Greece belong to the West or does it stand alone? How do these perceptions shape its foreign policy elite and decision-makers in clearly identifying and acting in favor of the defense of the national interest? The problematic for Greece is compounded by the fact that its neighbors to the East and the North are also caught up in their own cases of reconsideration regarding their identity and sense of belonging. The most apt example is the case of Turkey, which finds itself in conflict as to whether it has a place in the West and all things western or whether it has to reformulate its direction in favor of a Turkey-first concept. Turkey itself faces many, if not more of the same dilemmas as Greece, given its flank state status sharing borders with some highly volatile and ambitious neighbors, whether they are greater or lesser powers. To the North, the inability to totally tame the fires stemming from the end of the Cold War and the demise of Yugoslavia, and to integrate the countries in the region in the European mainstream has allowed for a surge in Russian influence at a time when the markings of a new Cold War or Cold Peace between Russia and the United States are in evidence. This also entails an increase and awareness of Russian exceptionalism which in defense of its national interest could potentially influence the course of Greece and its neighboring countries. Likewise, the increased Chinese presence via the Belt Road Initiative and the relevance of Greek assets such as the port of Piraeus for its realization also leaves its indelible mark. Finally, the renewed interest in hydrocarbons given their presence in the region, especially the Eastern Mediterranean, and its transit realities also shape the current geopolitical landscape (Caalson, 2014).

Hence, for a medium-sized EU member state like Greece, the value of alliances and sticking to them is key as is the ability to shape their direction and discourse. In attempting to identify whether a such a thing as a left-wing foreign policy is possible in today’s age especially for a small- or mediumsized state like Greece, Sotiris Roussos of the University of the Peloponnese suggests that the moral strength of a left-wing government is to stick to its values such as adherence to international law and its
principles and ensure that these are safeguarded and promoted within the international institutions it plays an active role in. It also should acknowledge that a small or medium sized country cannot change the international division of power or the nature of the capitalist system; it should thus seek to influence its neighborhood by building regional cooperation schemes which focus on economic and cultural cooperation. Finally, it can seek to be a conduit with a growing number of constructive non-state actors that seek to contribute to the stability of the international order. In fact, the trend is a symbiosis between ideological opposites and a realisation that strategic realism is the only possible fulcrum to defend the national interest (Dinas & Lamprini,2013:270).

In other words, if realism explains best today’s global trends, Greece needs both to respect the value of alliances and partnerships as well as seek to strengthen its hand outside them.

The principles of Greek foreign policy can be demonstrated through its commitment to embracing all nations who strive for democracy within their frontiers, and peaceful cooperation beyond them, into the European family.

Through the process of the ever past neighboring war in the Balkans, Greece has managed to inspire in the international community the importance of a consistent, universal and unifying policy towards South-Eastern Europe. What Southeast Europe needs most is to achieve a climate of security, democracy, and peace. The EU’s acceptance of Turkey’s candidate status at Helsinki will no doubt move closer to these goals (Featherstone & Kazamias,2001).

The globalization of the economy, the increasing power of the media, rapid developments in information technology, communications and biotechnology, are just some of the challenges Greece face. Greek citizens have discovered that they have an important role to play in relation to the citizens of other Balkan nations, the people of Turkey, and of Europe as a whole. The power of the people was confirmed by tragic events in our region. During the crisis in Kosovo, the Greek government actively supported the courageous efforts of Greek humanitarian non-governmental organizations.

Given its location, Greece can easily deploy military assets for collective security efforts in the region. It is also one of the few NATO countries that spends more than 2% of its GDP on defense. The Greek army and air force have participated in many NATO missions, including Afghanistan, and provided logistical support for the operations of the international coalition against ISIS. The Greek navy also operated in the eastern Mediterranean, helping to evacuate foreign nationals from Lebanon during the 2006 war, and Libya during the turmoil of 2014. Moreover, the country possesses military facilities vital to Western security (Armakolas & Giorgos,2015). In this context, Greece is building a new geopolitical identity as a bulwark for the West in the Eastern Mediterranean. This means that the country may have new responsibilities within the framework of NATO and Europe planning for regional security issues. Thus, Greece can become a provider of security that protects Western interests in a permanently volatile region.

Greece has revived its diplomatic power, for example, its efforts in the Palestinian issue, the tour to North Africa that included Tripoli and Cairo to revitalize bilateral relations, and an agreement with Saudi Arabia to deploy Greek Patriot batteries inside Saudi Arabia, and talks with Jordan, the UAE and Cyprus, which confirm that Greece is regaining its influence in an area that has been neglected for years, but this activity is caused by an old concern, which is Turkey, which the study will address in the next part of this study.

3- Determinants of Turkish-Greek relations

Relations between Turkey and Greece have gone through ups and downs since Greece gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1832. Since then, the two countries have fought four major wars: Greco-Turkish War in 1897, The First Balkan War in 1912, The First World War (1914-1918), The Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922) (Abdel Meguid,2020:17-20).

Relations between the two countries improved after World War II, and the two countries joined NATO in 1952. But relations between them deteriorated in the fifties of the last century as a result of the dispute over the island of Cyprus, the expulsion of the Greeks from Turkey in the sixties, the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974, and the confrontation between the two countries over the Aegean Sea (Abdullah,2020).

In 1999, a period of relative normalization began in relations, which led to a change in Greek opposition to Turkey’s bid to join the European Union (Abdusalam,2020).

This part of the study deals with the most important contentious issues that define Turkish-Greek relations as follows:
1.3 Dispute in the Aegean Sea

The islands in the Aegean Sea are the most sensitive and controversial issues in the Turkish-Greek relations, as the dispute over control of the maritime and air space in the Aegean Sea is evident (BBC news, 2017).

Because of the lack of understanding, skirmishes and harassment between the air forces and the navy of the two sides are repeated, sometimes developing into a military clash, amid international warnings that one of these skirmishes could lead to a broader military clash between the two countries, especially since the tension has escalated since the early nineties, amid a race armament between the two countries (Migdalovitz, 2010).

In 1995, Turkey announced that Greece's expansion of its sea and air space would be considered a cause for war, especially since Greek demands were not limited to the maritime space, but also exceeded it to the airspace, when Greece announced the extension of its space in the Aegean Sea from 6 to 10 miles (AlJazeera, 2020).

The borders of present-day Turkey were demarcated. Turkey, which is the heir to the Ottoman Empire, lost its sovereignty over many islands in the Aegean Sea in favor of Greece. Since then, the two countries have quarreled over the exclusive economic zone between the Greek islands and the Turkish coasts (Alsharif, 2020).

Turkey's demarcation of the maritime borders between it and the Libyan Government of National Accord also led to the disruption of implementing the Mideast pipeline, so the pipeline could not be implemented without obtaining Turkey's approval, because the proposed demarcation led to the annexation of some Greek islands to Turkey's exclusive economic zone, which the pipeline will pass through it (Alrantissi, 2020).

2.3 Dispute over the island of Cyprus

The Ottomans entered the island of Cyprus in 1571, after the Italian Venetians evacuated it, and the Turkish population replaced them. Since that date, Cyprus has been under the Ottoman Empire for three centuries (BBC news, 2017).

The island, located in the far Eastern Mediterranean, has experienced periods of stability and prosperity, as well as periods of political and social turmoil. In 1878, the Ottoman Empire ceded Cyprus to Britain, according to a secret treaty in which Britain pledged to help Turkey ward off the Russian danger from it. But Britain canceled this treaty during World War I, and declared in 1925 that Cyprus was a "royal colony" (Ozkan & Hasan, 2011).

Cyprus remained under British tutelage until it gained its independence in 1960, after the three countries: Britain, Turkey, and Greece agreed on the method of governance on the island. It was agreed that there should be a commitment in the Cypriot constitution for the participation of the Turkish minority in power. However, the Greek majority, which constitutes about two-thirds of the island's population, did not fulfill its obligations, and a dispute broke out between the two parties, which developed until it became known as the "Cyprus problem/issue" (Midalovitz, 2010).

In 1974 the Cypriot National Guard, made up of officers loyal to the military rule in Greece, moved and occupied the presidential palace, and tried to kill President Makarios III. However, after he survived and attended the United Nations General Assembly in Washington, he declared that his country was occupied by the Greeks (Alsawy, 2020).

Immediately, the Turkish army moved to protect the Turkish minority on the island, and to normalize the political situation of Cyprus. Then Turkey declared the northern part of the island a Turkish federation in (1983) (Altaweel, 2004).

The admission of Southern Cyprus to the European Union further complicates the crisis, and the matter has become an obstacle for Turkey in its maritime borders. Perhaps this is what is meant primarily by accepting the membership of a country suffering from a crisis at an international level, which is contrary to the laws of the European Union itself (Alsawy, 2020).

While Turkey stresses the necessity of negotiating on the basis of the two-state solution in Cyprus, after the failure of the federal solution negotiations for half a century, Greece insists on imposing the federal solution on the island (Midalovitz, 2010).

Since the collapse of the UN-sponsored reunification talks in Switzerland in July 2017, there have been no formal UN-mediated negotiations to settle the Cyprus conflict (Oglu, 2021).

The Cyprus issue presents a challenge to Turkey. Because it delays the process of negotiations regarding accession to the European Union, as Turkey refused to trade with Cyprus in violation of the customs agreement it had with the European Union, the Council of the European Union postponed the main accession talks for Turkey to the European Union (Haddad, 2016).
From an international community perspective, the Cyprus problem is viewed from the perspective of a single state, with the exception of Turkey, which sees in Cyprus two states, one called Turkish Cyprus and the other Greek Cyprus. Accordingly, Turkey adopts two different policies towards one small island. However, the file is often treated as a single problem with intertwined and multiple political, legal, border, economic and security dimensions (Alwan, 2019).

The Turkish Cypriot coast between 2018-2020 witnessed an escalation in military and political events, interspersed with diplomatic quarrels and statements, in addition to military maneuvers carried out by the countries of this coast.

The "Sea Wolf 2019" maneuver is considered one of the largest military exercises in the Mediterranean region. It included a simulation of a war on three seas. Turkey wanted to display its military strength and send a message of reassurance to the Turkish Cypriots. As well as wants through these naval exercises emphasize the level of readiness for any unexpected scenarios, so from a Turkish perspective, it was considered in response to a Greek Cypriot quest to steal the rights of the Turkish Cypriot water (Alwarawri, 2021), in addition to the maneuvers carried out by Northern Cyprus with the Turkish side, known as the "Mediterranean Storm", a maneuver organized periodically aimed at clarifying the level of military cooperation between the two parties (Antar, 2020).

Cyprus has also joined with France, Greece and Italy in a joint military maneuver in the Eastern Mediterranean which was called "Eunomia 2020" maneuver, the French Minister of Defense described these maneuvers as an indicator to fully obligated to the international law, Italy linked the existing geopolitical status quo in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin as a strategic interest deeply connected to the security of Europe due to competition for abundant energy and Italy's interest in that the presence of important Italian companies for exploration (Abdelmeguid, 2020).

Cyprus has accused Turkey of acting as a pirate in the Eastern Mediterranean and "gas piracy", due to its "illegal" exploration in its exclusive economic zone, and the Cypriot government said that Ankara is increasing its role and expanding its influence through "illegal expansion plans" in the Eastern Mediterranean, by an attempt to explore for gas in two "blocks" of its exclusive economic zone (Abdullah, 2020).

3.3 Dispute over the continental shelf

Greece relies on the continental shelf to draw the border with Turkey, within the islands and disputed areas in the Aegean Sea. The continental shelf is defined as the natural extension of land into seas and oceans. For any coastal state, it is the bed and subsoil of the submarine expanses that extend beyond the territorial sea. The coastal state has sovereign rights over its continental shelf (BBC News, 2017).

According to the first international law of the sea, issued in Geneva in 1958, and the second international law of the sea in 1982, the Eastern Mediterranean is an exclusive economic zone for Egypt and Turkey. However, after the third international law of the sea in 1982, Greece declared its continental shelf with a depth of 12 nautical miles, which infuriated Turkey (Alzoubi, 2011).

Greece has been working, in recent years, to expand its continental shelf, even though the islands it controls are closer to Turkey than to Greece (Alsharif, 2020).

Greece and Egypt announced the signing of an agreement to demarcate the borders of the exclusive economic zone of the continental shelf of the two countries. Details of the official text of the agreement have not yet been disclosed. The Turks believe that this aims to erase the maritime borders between Turkey and Libya, as well as damage the Turkish shipping line (Alsawy, 2020).

This agreement was preceded by several months by another agreement signed by the leaders of Cyprus, Greece and Israel, in Athens on January 2, 2020, to build a gas pipeline known as “East Med”, with a length of 1,900 km to transport natural gas from the eastern Mediterranean to Europe (BBC News, 2017).

In November 2019, the Turkish government and the Libyan Government of National Accord concluded an agreement demarcating the maritime borders between the two countries in the Mediterranean (Alsawy, 2020).

Greece is making exceptional efforts to confine Turkey to its land borders, and to prevent it from benefiting from its beaches and territorial waters, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean, armed with European and French support in particular (Moldavitz, 2010). In contrast, Turkey seems more determined than ever not to forfeit its maritime rights in what it calls the "blue homeland" (Alsharif, 2020).
4.3 refusal to recognize the Turkish minority in Greece

According to the population exchange agreement signed between Greece and Turkey on January 30, 1923, the Turkish Muslims who live between the Merig River (Evros), which separates the borders of the two countries, up to the city of “Qola” and the “Kara Suu” river in Greece, were excluded from the exchange, to acquire the status of a "minority" under the Lausanne Convention (1923) (Turkpress,2020).

The number of Turkish minorities in the western Thrace region of Greece is about 150,000. The Greek authorities refuse to grant them the status of a Turkish minority and are limited to recognizing them as a Muslim minority only. They suffer from social, legal, and religious problems, as they are not allowed to elect their imams and representatives, which deprives them of their rights stipulated in the Treaty of Lausanne (Alsawy,2020).

In contrast, the Greek Orthodox minority enjoys full freedom as the recognized Roman minority in Turkey.

Greek officials visited the Greek Orthodox in Turkey and heard from them the concerns of the Roman minority in Turkey. In this context, they ignore the Turkish presence in Greece (BBC News,2017).

5.3 Harboring of Turkish and Kurdish opponents in Greece

Greece is harboring Turkish coup plotters who fled to Greece after the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016, and there are Turkish demands to hand them over to Turkey (Vao News,2020).

Greece also harbors a number of Kurds, whom Turkey classifies as members of terrorist organizations, such as followers of the Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen and members of the Kurdistan Workers Party, which is banned in Turkey (Al-Rantissi,2020).

The Kurds are the largest ethnic minority in Turkey and are located in the eastern side of Turkey.

An armed conflict has arisen between Turkey and the Kurds, due to the Kurds’ demand of being recognized as a minority and granting them more rights and freedoms, or secession from Turkey with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state or obtaining autonomy. The Kurds have resorted to armed action led by the Kurdistan Workers Party, which was founded General (1984) (Karapat,2010).

The European Union considers Kurdish citizens among the minorities and demands that Turkey grant them their full and undiminished rights. Turkey has responded to the demands of the European Union, and the Kurds were allowed to use the Kurdish language in education and media in 2002, and negotiations began to stop the immediate fighting and the withdrawal of Kurdish fighters from inside Turkish territory and transferring the party’s headquarters to another destination outside Turkey (Karapat,2010).

However, there are concerns that any failure to achieve reconciliation with the Kurds will put the Turkish government on a line of confrontation with the military establishment that wants to eliminate the PKK, in addition to delaying Turkey's membership in the European Union (Al-Sawy,2020).

6.3 Exploratory talks

Exploratory talks are used to refer to negotiations between two countries in order to find lasting solutions to problems in the political, economic, and other fields (Abdel-Meguid,2020).

The exploratory negotiations began for the first time between Turkey and Greece in 2002, in order to establish the process of dialogue initiated by the political elites in that period through the use of diplomacy tools. Its meetings continued until 2016, and then resumed (Migdalovitz,2010); Due to the escalation of tension between Greece and Turkey (Addullah,2020).

The exploratory talks are taking place through various dialogue mechanisms, with the participation of technical delegations, under the auspices of the foreign ministries of the two countries.

There is a popular desire on both sides to overcome the chronic historical problems. However, the intransigence of political institutions and the pressures of nationalist currents, have deepened these problems instead of solving them, to the extent that there has been no tangible positive result from the sixty exploratory meetings that have been held so far (BBC News,2017).

7.3 Exploration of natural resources in the Mediterranean

There is a chronic dispute between Turkey and Greece over the conflicting demands for sovereignty over oil and gas resources in the Mediterranean region, and tension has escalated between the two countries since 2019 after Turkey announced the resumption of exploration for natural resources in the Mediterranean region (France24).
Turkey has resumed drilling for hydrocarbons in a disputed area in the Eastern Mediterranean, the day after the signing of a maritime agreement between Greece and Egypt, which Turkey denounced. Turkey sent (the seismic survey ship) Barbaros Khair al-Din to explore for oil, after Turkey confirmed that Greece did not abide by its commitments related to the exploration of energy resources in the region (Abdel-Meguid, 2020).

Looking at the Eastern Mediterranean basin and the arenas of direct conflict, the study believes that Egypt sided with the alliance of Greece and Cyprus; during the crisis and flare-up phase of the energy crisis and the maritime borders, as Egypt signed an agreement on the delimitation of the maritime borders in the Mediterranean. As there were no economic benefits for Egypt, but rather harmed it by reducing the rights of economic areas of Egypt, it was considered a political movement against Turkey after its agreement with the Government of National Accord on the demarcation of the border, Egypt also considered that international law is on the side of the Greek state as an argument (Abdullah, 2020).

The Turkish language towards this agreement was severe, as the Turkish Foreign Ministry considered that this agreement does not add anything, as there are no maritime borders between Greece and Egypt. The Egyptian media also exported this agreement as an end to Erdogan’s ambition in the Eastern Mediterranean and the abolition of the Al-Sarraj agreement, but without analyzing the economic or security interests of Egypt at the level (Al-Sawy, 2020).

Looking at the limits of the spatial study in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin, and from the perspective of alliances in this geographical area, it’s clear that one of the most important arenas of conflict for Egypt with Turkey in this region, which is Libya; due to its strategic security importance to Egypt (Al-Sharif, 2020).

The Libyan arena included alliances of two types, military alliances, as Turkey directly supported Al-Sarraj’s forces logistically and fighters in addition to Turkish forces, while Egypt supported Haftar’s forces in addition to Al-Sisi’s presentation of General Haftar in diplomatic forums, until Al-Sarraj’s forces reached “Al-Jufra” after the defeat of Haftar’s forces. Then, Sisi announced that if Al-Sarraj’s forces cross the “red line”, there will be an intervention by the Egyptian army on Libyan soil, as the Egyptian People’s Assembly supported this step (Al-Rantissi, 2020).

The second type of alliances were alliances to support popular forces to create influential political forces. Al-Sisi hosted Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, Aqila Saleh, Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives in Cairo, which included the launch of Cairo to solve the Libyan crisis. Erdogan’s response was by hosting Khaled Al-Mashri, head of the Libyan Supreme Council, and the response was that Libya did not need such initiatives (Al-Sawy, 2020).

Turkish-Greek relations are considered thorny relations since the era of the Ottomans; according to the testimony of the Romanian Minister Djovara, author of book “Hundred Project to divide Turkey”, Djovara described that the origin of the chronic hatred between the Europeans and the Turks, so they had striven to confine them to Asia, was rooted in the hostility that raged between Christianity and Islam (Abdel-Meguid, 2020).

Turkey’s signing of an agreement with the Government of National Accord (NGA) in 2019 to demarcate the Turkish-Libyan waters had a blatant Greek reaction, as it considered it illogical by virtue of the international law of the sea and by virtue of geopolitics (Abdullah, 2020).

The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Turkish ambassador in its country to hand him a protest note, because with this treaty, Turkey had canceled the legitimacy of the Greek island of Crete, which lies between the Turkish and Libyan coasts. Turkey took a political turn, and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said that his country had signed the two treaties “to protect Turkey’s rights stemming from international law,” while the Turkish presidency said that the two treaties on the maritime field came "to protect the two countries' rights to sovereignty over maritime areas" (Abdel-Meguid, 2020).

But Greece retaliated against Turkey, with an agreement between it, Israel and Cyprus in 2020, where the Turkish reaction was the Turkish parliament’s approval to send Turkish forces to Libya, although this decision was previously opposed (Al-Sawy, 2020).

Future of Turkish-Greek relations

After reviewing the nature of Turkish-Greek relations, the determinants affecting these relations, and the attempts of each of them to play an effective regional role, the researcher tries to present three scenarios about the development or deterioration of these relations, as follows:
1.5 The first scenario: Maintaining the status quo (directional or linear scenario)

This scenario assumes that the status quo remains as it is between Turkish-Greek relations, which are highly tense, because Greece is trying to turn the crisis between it and Turkey into a European crisis, as it is a member of the European Union.

Greece is also trying to achieve its extremist and unjust demands through Turkey, through the power it obtains from the European Union based on its membership in it (Aljazeera, 2020). But the EU does not fully support Greece, because the integration of security and foreign policy is one of the weakest areas of EU integration, as these two areas are still subject to the decisions of nation-states.

Therefore, when it comes to the countries of the Union, they act in accordance with the interests of their countries and take their decisions accordingly, and they also do not want to be part of the Greek tension with Turkey. Thus, all this led to the marginalization of Greece, Cyprus, and France within the European Union (Alain Network, 2020).

Greece aims to obtain European support because by comparing Greece and Turkey in terms of economic and military strength and population, we will find that Greece is not a country that can confront Turkey and impose its extremist and unjust demands on it in any way. Therefore, Greece is looking for allies and seeking support from abroad. On the other hand, there is also a historical dimension to this issue. Since it is believed that the foundations of Western civilization were laid in Greece in the past, there is a long-standing positive discrimination towards Greece on the part of the West, which makes Greece try to put pressure on Turkey by exploiting this point (BBC News, 2017).

Also, the European Union countries - with the exception of France, Greece and Cyprus - do not want to demolish the “bridges” that link them to Turkey, as they have interdependent relations in multiple fields, such as the economy, defense industries, immigration and combating terrorism (Aljazeera, 2020).

It is also possible to change Biden’s policy towards Turkey, in return for the steps that the United States will take towards Russia, China and Iran in accordance with its foreign policy, which will affect relations between Turkey and the European Union, and will reduce Greek pressure on the latter to make unfair decisions against Turkey (Koosa, 2021).

For this reason, this scenario assumes that the tension will remain as it is in Turkish-Iranian relations without a negative development that reaches military power, with attempts at détente from time to time through bilateral talks conducted by the two countries under European or American auspices.

This will be reflected in the continued competition between the two countries for a regional role in the Middle East and Mediterranean.

2.5 The second scenario: the positive development of Turkish-Greek relations (the reform scenario)

This scenario assumes the improvement of Turkish-Greek relations through agreements and talks, the most serious of which was when the two countries established the Cooperation Council in 2010, which was able to frame positive relations followed by joint and successive meetings and regular summits to improve economic and political relations between the two countries.

The Greek and Turkish people welcomed the improvement of economic relations between Turkey and Greece as an opportunity to deal with the crises that the two countries face towards each other (DW, 2020).

In this context, it is possible to refer to the strengthening of trade relations, tourism and transactions between the two countries, which relieves the existing tension and creates a win-win situation for both sides (Alain Network, 2020).

However, the chances of achieving this scenario remain difficult despite the positive developments that occurred in the recent conferences that brought the two countries together, including the April 2021 conference, which expressed the Greek community’s increased interest in Turkish politics, especially after several unstable governments and huge economic crises that Greece went through, when Turkey attracts with its stable government and economic growth, it drew the interest of Greek society and the ruling regimes there (Osman, 2021).

On contrast, anxiety mixed with caution prevails over the future of bilateral relations between the two countries, especially in light of the persistence of outstanding problems between the two countries despite an understanding to solve them, especially the willingness to resume the frozen peace process related to the island of Cyprus, which could constitute an important ground for reactivating a new process on the...
island of Cyprus, and the existence of an agreement on some joint projects such as the express railway project that will link Istanbul and Thessaloniki.

Optimism remains cautious about the development of Turkish-Greek relations, especially after the visit of the Greek Foreign Minister to Turkey in April 2021, through which he sent internal and external messages suggesting that the visit came as a result of European pressure on Greece (Alain Network, 2020).

3.5 The third scenario: the deterioration of Turkish-Greek relations (the transformational or radical scenario)

This scenario assumes that Turkish-Iranian relations will develop negatively to the point of using military force in the event that Turkey and Greece perceive that they threaten each other. This scenario is supported by the anti-Turkish nationalism in Greece and its counterpart in Turkey, which has become a subject for ridicule in Turkish and Greek movies, and the fueling of these conflicts by extremist nationalist groups from both countries (Aljazeera, 2020).

This scenario also supports the great tension in Turkish-Greek relations during the current period, which raises questions about the future of the existing crisis between the two countries, and the possibilities that this tension will spark an armed conflict between Turkey and Greece in light of the escalating tension between them regarding the natural resources in the Eastern Mediterranean after Turkey deployed an exploration ship in the region in 2020, accompanied by a fleet of warships in the waters between Cyprus and the Greek islands of Kastelorizo and Crete (DW, 2020).

It can be emphasized that the tension between Turkey and Greece has reached a dangerous level, based on a number of indicators, the most prominent of which are: the great threat to Greece by the language of the Turkish discourse, in addition to the military exercises Turkey is carrying out in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which it does not recognize except for Turkey.

In return for the Turkish escalation, Greece responded by conducting naval maneuvers with many allies of the European Union, which tends to support Greece's position, especially France, in addition to Greece's declaration that there are no scheduled talks between it and Turkey to ease the increasing tensions between them in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The study do not rule out Turkish anger over Greece's promotion of itself as a regional power and a democratic strategic alternative in the region, and its attempt to obtain American support in light of the sanctions imposed on Turkey. Greece has succeeded in investing in bilateral partnerships, in contrast to Turkey, which has taken a confrontational approach with its neighbors in the region and its Western allies.

Greece invested its diplomacy in the Arab region by providing logistical support for the operations of the international coalition against ISIS. The Greek navy also operated in the eastern Mediterranean, helping to evacuate foreign nationals from Lebanon during the 2006 war, and Libya during the turmoil in 2014, it contributed to a peace mission to Israel and Palestine, and its foreign minister made visits to North Africa, including Libya and Egypt, in addition to making agreements with Saudi Arabia to deploy Greek Patriot batteries inside Saudi Arabia, and high-ranking Greek officials held countless talks with Jordan and Emirates (Koosa, 2021).

Despite all the tension between Turkey and Greece, the study excludes this scenario; because the stage of armed conflict is not an easy possibility. Both Turkey and Greece are aware that there will be great losses that will be inflicted on them in the event of such a conflict.

In addition, the European Union is pressing hard on Turkey to stop its escalation against Greece and engage in a bilateral or multilateral dialogue to resolve the crisis between the two parties, the European Union has urged Turkey more than once to stop drilling activities, threatening to impose sanctions on it if it refuses to resolve the conflict through dialogue (Alain Network, 2020).

Conclusion

The study revealed the following results:

- One of the strengths of Turkish foreign policy is what this country possesses of a distinguished geographical location, water resources, and human capabilities that contributed to building the trained military force, as well as a strong economy within the G20.
- Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took over the reins of power in Turkey in 2002, a fundamental change has taken place in Turkish foreign policy, starting from a number of foreign policy principles on which Turkey relied, including Strategic...
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depth, Soft power, Proactive diplomacy, Humanitarian diplomacy, Zeroing problems, adopting a multi-dimensional foreign policy, participation as an active member in all international institutions, and hosting many conferences held by international organizations, and building a solid network of relations in all vital political, economic and cultural fields.

- One of the strengths of Greek foreign policy is the country’s unique geographic location, water resources, high economy, membership in the European Union, and a long history as it is considered the cradle of Western democracies.

- The principles of Greek foreign policy can be demonstrated through its commitment to embracing all nations who strive for democracy within their frontiers, and peaceful cooperation beyond them, into the European family.

- Relations between Turkey and Greece have gone through ups and downs since Greece gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1832. Since then, the two countries have fought four major wars: Greco-Turkish War in 1897, The First Balkan War in 1912, The First World War (1914-1918), The Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922).

- Relations between the two countries are determined by various contentious issues that are represented by the dispute in the Aegean Sea, the dispute over the island of Cyprus, the dispute over the continental shelf, the refusal to recognize the Turkish minority in Greece, Athens’ harboring of Turkish and Kurdish opponents wanted by the Turkish government, exploratory talks, Greece’s strategy in dealing with Turkey, and the exploration for natural resources in the Mediterranean.

- In light of the determinants of Turkish-Greek relations, the study proposed three Scenarios to the future of that bilateral relation: The first scenario to maintain the status quo, the second scenario to improve the Turkish-Greek relations, the third scenario to worsen Turkish-Greek relations. These scenarios are subject to their occurrence in light of developments on the ground.

**Recommendations**

In light of the results obtained, the study recommends the following:

1. Both Turkey and Greece need to understand that they are neighbors in a critical geopolitical climate and have an important issue at hand involving regional problems and disputes over energy resources that may witness interference by external parties, under those circumstances, both countries need to increase the degree of direct communication channels in order to prevent any misunderstanding or miscommunication and to reduce the impact of external factors on the process.

2. In order to reduce the seriousness of the crises and their impact on Turkish-Greek relations, the two countries must improve social and cultural dialogue networks and enhance economic cooperation between them. It is indeed possible to see change in the Turkish and Greek street, this positive climate needs to be nourished and supported by cultural and social policies, and in the absence of this network of Complex economic and social relations, the relations between the two countries will be easy prey for diplomatic crises and political disagreements.

3. For Turkey to play its effective regional role, it must increase its allies in the regional neighborhood, provided that Turkey fulfills its obligations towards its allies, supports them to face the dangers that threaten them, and defends their vital interests as it defends its own interests. In addition to the possibility of modernizing and expanding cooperation between Turkey and the European Union in the areas of economic union, modernizing the customs union to serve the interests of both parties, and establishing partnership relations that may lead to Turkey’s membership in the European Union on the one hand, and reduce European pressure on Turkey in favor of Greece on the other hand.

4. Conducting more studies on Turkish-Greek relations in light of the ongoing developments on the outstanding contentious issues between the two countries.

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