2023

Is Oppositeness Necessary for the Interpretation of Verbal Irony?

Mohammad Al-Kuran  
*Translation Department, Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan.*

Mahmoud Al-Kanakry  
*Translation Department, Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan.*

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.aaru.edu.jo/aauja

Part of the Language Interpretation and Translation Commons

Recommended Citation

Al-Kuran, Mohammad and Al-Kanakry, Mahmoud (2023) "Is Oppositeness Necessary for the Interpretation of Verbal Irony?" *Association of Arab Universities Journal for Arts* مجلة اتحاد الجامعات العربية للآداب Vol. 20: Iss. 2, Article 10. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.aaru.edu.jo/aauja/vol20/iss2/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Arab Journals Platform. It has been accepted for inclusion in Association of Arab Universities Journal for Arts مجلة اتحاد الجامعات العربية للآداب by an authorized editor. The journal is hosted on Digital Commons, an Elsevier platform. For more information, please contact rakan@aaru.edu.jo, marah@aaru.edu.jo, u.murad@aaru.edu.jo.
Al-Kuran and Al-Kanakry: Is Oppositeness Necessary for the Interpretation of Verbal Irony?
Abstract

Verbal irony traditionally holds that one says something literally and means the opposite. This paper argues that the ironic intention occurs when the speaker says something that differs from what he intends. The intended meaning is not necessarily contradictory to what is said. The paper, therefore, is an attempt to demonstrate that the traditional view of verbal irony is not an adequate representation of the various forms that verbal irony can take, where oppositeness, which seems not to be straightforward in its dictionary sense, is an unnecessary condition to account for verbal irony. More specifically, it will show that verbal irony tends to occur even when the utterance means exactly what it literally says. The paper also aims to show that verbal irony occurs not only as a result of flouting the Quality Maxim but of other maxims as well.

Keywords: Reconstruction, Truthful maxim, Cultural expectation, Negation, Relevance principle, Principle of politeness.

1. Introduction

Irony is a form of language employed by its speakers to deliver a certain message. It can be used to condemn or draw the flaws of a certain person who is expected or thought to be untrustworthy or could create evil action. One simple example appears in Shakespeare’s play Juluis Caesar when Mark Antony said during Caesar’s funeral that Brutus is “an honorable man” though Brutus was a very dishonorable man involved in the killing of Caesar.

Irony has been a topic that has been undertaken by many scholars such as, Sperber 1984, Gibbs 1986, Wilson and Sperber 2012, Sperber and Wilson 1992, Giora 1995, to mention some names. Irony has been employed by many writers in their works. For instance, it is mentioned that the great novelist Jane Austin (17751817-) was called the master of irony, and so are the great writers such as Chaucer and Henry Fielding (1707, p.54).

There are many types of irony, the most common of which are:

a) Verbal irony when the words of the irony do not imply a literal meaning.

b) Situational irony is when there is a difference between the expected and the actual outcome of a situation or action.

c) Dramatic irony when the audience knows certain information that the characters are not aware of.

This study is primarily dedicated to undertaking the first one, namely, verbal irony.
2. The Cooperative Principle of Irony

A review of the literature on verbal irony shows that the standard definition of irony has passed virtually unchanged in linguistics studies. A considerable amount of research on irony is congruent with the traditional notion of figurative meaning perceived as the opposite of what is said literally. However, this approach fails to explicate or offer a satisfactory explanation of why metaphors and irony should exist at all. Grice (1975) holds that for efficient communication, a speaker should speak sincerely, relevantly, and clearly. The authors of this principle consider the violation of the Quality Maxim (say what you believe to be true) as essentially what triggers verbal irony, which is the main issue of this paper. Grice (1975) analyzed the notion of figurative meaning in terms of conversational implicature where the ironically intended intention of the utterance, would conversationally imply, rather than figuratively mean, the opposite of the literal meaning, as Sperber and Wilson (1992) observe. The fact that pro-truthfulness maxim scholars consider irony to be only a violation of the Maxim of Quality is very congruous with their way of viewing irony as pointing in the opposite direction of what is literally said. To recover the speaker’s intention, Levinson (1982, p.14) observes that “it is important for the speaker and the hearer to share common knowledge and beliefs.” It follows that an interpreter who is not familiar with the speaker’s beliefs or cognitive state may not be able to recover the speaker’s ironic intention. This consequence is as much valid as wondering why the speaker and the listener should cooperate, to begin with.

In default of clear-cut criteria that would explain how to move from the literal meaning to the figurative meaning, authors have used their premises and assumptions to account for the non-conventional meaning of said utterances. Searle (1979a, p. 113) argues that “the hearer is compelled to reinterpret the speaker’s intention since the figurative meaning does not follow from the literal meaning of the said utterances.” Such interpretation, he observes, entails the reconstruction of the utterance message to render it appropriate, and the best way to do so is to assign a meaning opposite to its form. This approach is identical to Grice’s treatment of verbal irony as holding meaning contradictory to the proposition contained in the utterance.

What seems startling is that neither Grice nor Searle, who adhere to the traditional approach, provided a plausible explanation of how one could move from the literal meaning to the figurative meaning that they deem as the opposite of the semantic meaning of the utterance. To this effect, Vance (2012, p.5) “undermines the value of the Gricean and Searelean approach because it underestimates other forms verbal irony can take, and fails to recognize the non-cooperative motivations behind verbal irony”

3. Contradiction Versus Contrariety

A close look into some English dictionaries shows that irony is defined as a mismatch between what is said and what is meant, and such incongruity is taken in terms of oppositeness. The Oxford Advanced Learner Dictionary defines irony as showing that you really mean the opposite of what you are saying, while Webster’s Third International Dictionary takes irony as saying something that is exactly opposite of what is meant or expected to happen. In a similar vein, Meriam Webster mentions that irony occurs when what is said literally is contrary or contradictory to the intended meaning. If we check further what contradiction and contrariety mean, we will find
that these two words are presented as equally synonymous in their dictionary sense, for they are used as entries of each other, and as entries under the headword ‘opposite’ as well. These two words, as we will see next, are not identical since the ironic content of an utterance can be interpreted either in terms of the predicate or proposed negation of what is literally expressed as an ironic remark. This distinction might justify the difficulty of finding the exact opposite of the semantic literal content of an ironically intended message. It might as well distort the notion of irony and call for a redefinition of irony as a theoretical device form of communication.

The dictionary sense of irony clings to the traditional view of irony represented by Grice and Searle who claim that people detect ironic meaning by becoming aware of the apparent flouting of the principle of truthfulness (say what you believe to be true) Thus, when Mark Anthony said Brutus is an honorable man, meaning Brutus is not an honorable man, the shift from the literal meaning to the non-literal meaning occurs via negation. Dane (2011, p.56) holds that this example, however, represents one type of utterance, “where the speaker uses a biased language of an opponent in full confidence that the public recognizes its lack of creditability to the extent that the ironic words are so salient to be taken in a sense opposed to their proper sense”. Bredin (1997) calls this ironic utterance Contradictory, where the intended meaning directly contradicts the literal meaning. With contrary ironies, he observes that this is not the case. To get his point across, he argues that the negation of someone’s statement that a particular object is black might be “it is not black or is white”. In the first case (is not black), there is no other possibility since the two opposites contradict each other. In other words, the object is either black or not black. In the case of negating by (white) where white stands as the opposite of black, Bredin argues that there is a possibility that both statements are wrong because there are other possibilities: the object might be of a different color, but it cannot be both white and black simultaneously. This form of negation is perceived as one of contrariety since white does not seem like a mere negation of black. It is thus obvious that there are potentially multiple meanings of which contrary ironies are capable. For this reason, Horn (1985, p.123) argues that contrary negations are not negations in the general sense of the term because the two presumably opposites are incompatible and hence inconsistent. That is to say, the two opposites counter- pose with each other as positives. It is therefore imprudent for a person to consider a dictionary an indispensable aid for the clarity of concepts, especially in his research. Horn (1985) warns that a dictionary should not have the final authority on the meanings of words that can prove wrong or miss the whole truth of the concept.

4. Negation-based Interpretation

In light of these observations, one might wonder what makes the predicate negation account better for the ironic interpretation. Horn (1992) argues that this type of negation does not point in the opposite direction of the literal sense as a mere negation of the literal sense of the utterance, since it has no point of evaluation on the part of the speaker. To this effect, Giora (1995, p. 241) perceives that “predicate negation is a stronger opposite of what is normally meant, whereas propositional negation invites weaker interpretations whereby just one value of the spectrum is negated while the rest is affirmed. To elucidate the point, consider this statement (1) “It is lovely weather today” uttered by someone in a downpour. Given the two modes of negation, there are two ways of negating this statement (1a) It is not lovely weather (propositional negation), or (1b) It is awful weather today” (lexical negation)
Is Oppositeness Necessary for the Interpretation of Verbal Irony?

Havertake (1990) argues that (1b) rather than (1a) is the kind of the opposite of utterance (1) which creates an ironic interpretation because it openly specifies the speaker’s negative evaluation and reflects his dissatisfaction with the weather. As for (1a), he argues that the affirmative proposition requires only a logical opposition because the propositional negation, which negates the whole proposition does not point to the speaker’s negative evaluation of the situation. Thus, the use of the utterance (1), to ironically comment on awful weather, appeals to other scholars such as Colston & Keller (1998), who take irony as a positive evaluation of a negative situation. This interpretation rests on the Pollyanna theory, which holds that culture has implicit expectations that can be interpreted as ironic once violated. This principle holds that, while the speaker is aware of the negative facts of the situation, he tends to speak positively of them.

Furthermore, Giora (1995) views irony as an indirect negated message whose interpretation requires no cancelation of that indirectly negated message or compensation for it with the implicated one. For her, both negated and the implicated message must be processed to render it appropriate. This view opposes “those who believe that irony carries one meaning only. Giora (1995, p. 261) also holds that: “the view of irony as an indirect negation that differs drastically from the traditional approach in that irony does not necessarily indicate its opposite.” She also added (p. 243) that “direct negation is limited while irony is not.” The point she is making is that negation is not the direct appropriate way to deny different types of statements such as approximations, hedged statements, and intensified statements, as the following example shows:

1. He is kind of stupid
2. I don’t think he is kind of stupid.
3. I don’t think he is stupid

Sentence (2) is unacceptable because it does not seem to implicate a different interpretation from its non-ironic reading while (3) is acceptable because it can be considered as implicating a different interpretation from its non-ironic reading.

From a different perspective, Sperber and Wilson (1992) argue that irony can be a case of mention. “Although the speaker does not mean what he literally uttered, it is by no means that he intends to get his belief about the weather across” (ibid:298). They argue that the speaker might instead have been trying to express an opinion, not about the weather, but about the content of utterance (1) itself, say, for example, that it had been absurd to think that the weather would be beautiful (p:298). What they are grounding here is that what matters is not what the content is about but what the content is. In this case, the speaker gets himself disassociated from the content by echoing an opinion or thought as if the downpour were the right moment for him to voice this utterance in the hearer’s presence without intending to mean the opposite of what the content literally says.

The idea that irony only points in the direction of a more specific, opposite meaning or a direct negation runs contrary to the fact that many of the communicative goals are unattainable by direct negation. It is almost impossible to apply negation to the constituents of an utterance as an explicit paraphrase of the apparent meaning. If a boss, addressing a waiter who forgot to clean his serving table, says to him (2) I keep waiters who are clean, he would not mean the opposite of what his utterance really says. The utterance involves no violation of the quality maxim (say what you believe to be true) nor does the more literally true assertion (2a) I do keep waiters who are clean, uttered in the same situation. The propositional negation (2b) ‘I do not keep waiters who are clean’ is not the
non-ironic paraphrase of (2) since it triggers the same ironic intention. In a similar vein, the lexical negation (2c) I keep waiters who are dirty is not the non-ironic paraphrase of (2) either since it too triggers an ironic intention. Add to this, there is no evidence that he wanted to communicate dirty as contrary to clean; in particular, no other specific opposites such as dishonest, crooked, or messy. Although such lexical negations explicitly involve a point of criticism on the part of the speaker, it would still be uneasy to pinpoint the exact contrary opposites intended by the speaker, due to the multiple opposites that the semantic content of (2) can trigger. Similarly, Horn (1989:39) takes the propositional negation (not) to mean less than. Thus, the negated proposition of “not clean” generally means less clean, not dirty in the true sense of the term.” This interpretation feeds into the notion that there is a scale in the use of negations when the proposition is concerned, whereas such a scale is unavailable in the case of predicate negation.

5. Criticism of Negation-based Interpretation

It is obvious so far that the intended meaning is not a reversal of the standard meaning whereby the intended meaning is nothing but a negation of the untruthful literal statement. Given the scope of oppositeness, one could claim that this example (2) “I keep waiters who keep their serving tables clean” does not necessitate negation which entails the replacement of the main verb and the adjective by their corresponding lexical opposites: I dismiss waiters who keep their tables unclean. Likewise, Yamanashi’s (1988:273) statement (3) “We admire those who are honest”, uttered to someone behaving dishonestly, appears to express a truthful statement “We despise those who are dishonest”, but falls short of bringing about the distinctive feature of this form of irony, i.e., the speaker’s literal truthfulness. It also fails to explain why interpretation necessitates the negation of two evaluative words. Despite the fact that the negation-based interpretation in (2) and (3) may indeed involve truthful meanings, they do not seem to form the speaker’s critical focal message that he wishes to convey in the context at hand, such as “I dismiss waiters who are unclean, and “We despise those who are dishonest”. Such implicatures that carry criticisms of the hearers are necessary for the negation-based interpretation; Otherwise, the negation-based paraphrases will be seen to be contextually irrelevant. Even if the implication with adequate referents were added to rectify this irrelevance, one may still be wondering about the reason for performing a two-fold negation.

As an alternative to the negation-based interpretation pattern that appears to be untenable, Partington (2007) introduces a new theory based on the assumption that the speaker utters what he believes to be false in order to convey an implicit message which is to be gleaned on the basis of meaning opposition. This model rests on the notion of verisimilar irony which requires evaluation communicated by any ironic utterance to be reversed in order to be relevant to a given context. The notion of verisimilar irony rests on untruthfulness, manifesting itself ‘as if implicature’ (untruthful implicature serving as an interpretive step) caused by flouting the relation maxim). This “as if implicature”, in turn, requires meaning reversal so that the ultimate evaluative implicature can be inferred. Applying this to (2), for example, Partington (2007, p.1564) suggests that the speaker implies a reversed evaluation, “dismiss” rather than “keep”, but he does not spell out that the reversal of the evaluative verb and adjective also involves a change in the referent of the focal evaluation (waiters’ tables versus your table”: I do not keep waiters (that is you) who have unclean serving tables (that is your table). Syllogistically, this seems to be a logical argument: “I do not keep waiters who have unclean serving tables”, and you’re a waiter and your table is unclean, and therefore “I don’t like you for keeping an unclean serving table. For better natural language use, the
Is Oppositeness Necessary for the Interpretation of Verbal Irony?

exact wording of such paraphrases might be changed. This way of reasoning about the intended meaning shows that the literal meaning is not a meaning that stands in contradiction to the intended message. Rather, it would be considered as part of what the utterance says, which in turn serves as the starting point for the focal critical implicature. Sperber and Wilson (1998) argue that even if what is said expresses the speaker’s belief, it is not what he/she wishes to convey, at least not the most vital message. The intended meaning, therefore, is not an inversion of the one literally expressed but not meant.

This view of the interpretive model involves a reconstruction process that Partington classifies into three layers. The expressed meaning (the said utterance) is an untruthful utterance that invites truthful ironic implicature, followed by an ultimate ironic implicature. Applying Partington’s model to (2), it becomes obvious that the expressed meaning “I keep waiters who are clean” is an untruthful utterance, which invites an intermediate truthful ironic implicature along the lines, such as “You are so good a waiter that you keep your table messed up.” The third layer involves an ultimate evaluative implicature: “I do not approve your unclean serving table.” The propositional meaning is not viewed as an assertion but implied making as if to say “I keep waiters who are clean.” In light of this model, the expressed meaning is the overt untruthfulness that invites an intermediate truthful ironic implicature, which in turn leads to the speaker’s critical evaluation of the implicature. Such evaluative implicature brings about criticism of specifically one intended waiter (I do not accept your having an unclean table.)

A verisimilar irony is a form that does not resonate with Grice’s maxim of quality. The assumption on which this form of irony is based is that the speaker says what he believes to be false, not what he believes to be true. Looking at it like this, one may argue it is not a form of irony. It may stand for other kinds of rhetorical phenomena. It should be noted here that scholars generally have paid attention to what is said in verisimilar irony as true or sincere assertions (Kummon-Nakamura et al (1995) and Stokke (2013). The alternative view of verisimilar irony where what is said is not considered an assertion has not been widely explored in the literature on irony.

Although Grice (1989b, p.51) seems to “differentiate between ‘asserting’ and ‘saying’ when he refers to the speaker as someone who aims to assert (or otherwise say)”, no attempt has been made to account for speakers’ and hearers’ actual cognitive processes underlying production and reception of irony. The ambiguity inherent in ironic language is a puzzle for researchers to understand how people grasp the meaning of ironic remarks. Such ambiguity led researchers to propose theories in different fields, including psychology, philosophy, and linguistics (Gibbs 2007 These theories, however, have been criticized for explaining only one piece of the puzzle. For instance, Grice’s account of verbal irony has been examined in terms of discourse conditions to be cooperative and exchange of information rather than more socially directed goals. This prompted Grice to ignore cases of verbal irony that do not have the exchange of information as their primary purpose. Apart from this, the cognitive processes involved or comprehension of particular subtypes are largely ignored by many scholars. Even Partington’s interpretive model of verisimilar ironies is just a mere assumption based on the idea that the speaker says what he believes to be false. This assumption is just one step in his proposed model to construct a coherent interpretation that fits the utterance.

Conversely, Turner (1999) does not believe that the retrieval of the message requires a complete reconstruction process of the ironic intention. She believes that the interpretation of the speaker’s ironic intention depends on the interpreter’s competence of inference, which is not necessarily based on shared knowledge or cooperation between
the speaker and the hearer. To this effect, Goatly (1994, p.151) claims “that as long as studies of ironic utterances rely on discourse as a cooperative process, they will always be irredeemably a social”

6. Arguments Against Negation and Cooperation Principles

The notion of reconstruction of the utterance message which implies meaning contradictory to the proposition contained in the utterance is not the sole principle triggering irony. Turner (1999, p.25) treats “the content of the message as more than just what propositional semantics can provide and less than the complete reconstruction of the speaker’s intention.” Partington’s interpretive model, therefore, is not appealing to her as a reconstruction process of the intended meaning. Instead, she asserts that the interpreter’s competence is necessary for drawing an inference without having to reason deeply about the speaker’s cognitive state or have any special knowledge about his cognitive state. Views concerning such distinctions indicate the slippery nature of oppositeness and provide further evidence that it is capable of multiple interpretations that do not always point to the exact opposite direction of the semantic literal meaning. There is even more evidence that awareness of the setting and situation is not a precondition for irony to occur. Kumon Nakamura et al (1995) argue that irony springs from the violation of the politeness principle. They argue that the indirect request (4) “Would you mind if I asked to shut the window?” uttered by a mom to her son, can be ironic, though the mom’s intention does not seem to point in the opposite direction of the literal, expressed meaning of her utterance.

It is also clear that neither the propositional negation (4a) “Would you not mind if I asked you to shut the window?” nor the lexical negation (4b) “Would you mind if I asked you to open the window?” is the non-ironic intention is triggered because a mother does not have to be so polite with her son since he has no power over her.

While some authors such as Schaffer (1982) regard the shared knowledge and beliefs between the speaker and the hearer as a crucial element to account for irony, Nakamura et al (1995) confirm that precondition is unnecessary to interpret the unusual sense of the utterance. The expressed meaning of (5) “How old did you say you were? said to someone behaving inappropriately to his age, carries the ironic intention that the addressee becomes aware of after realizing the speaker’s expectation for him to display appropriate social behavior. The ironic intention of this utterance has no sense of oppositeness since the speaker does not seem to communicate the opposite of what he says literally. He actually means what he literally says. It also shows that the ironic situation in which the utterance is said is not always crucial for irony to occur nor is oppositeness of the usual sense of the utterance always sufficient to trigger irony. It is even pointless to apply negation to the constituents of this utterance since either kind of negation (propositional, lexical) will again trigger an ironic intention.

There is no escape from admitting, however, that, although an ironic utterance is far more expressive than the direct meaning, lending both wit and sharpness to the conversation, it is unfair to claim that these attributes are only a function of oppositeness. Attardo’s (2000) utterance (6) “This is the happiest night in my life”, uttered in the early morning cannot be seen as communicating a meaning contradictory to what it literally says. It is only inappropriate because it mismatches the context in which it is produced. The speaker’s ironic intention, in this case, comes about by the word night, which would render his utterance as being neither true nor false. Thus, by being ironic, a speaker
Is Oppositeness Necessary for the Interpretation of Verbal Irony?

can violate the principle of relevance. On the other hand, applying negation to the whole proposition: (6a) “This is not the happiest night in my life is still ironic”: it is not the non-ironic paraphrase of the original sentence “This is the happiest night in my life”.

There are cases where the verbal ironic statement is incongruent with the widely-held belief derived from the statement. Martin (1992) argues that the utterance: (7) “Our friends are always there when we need them” is perceived as being ironic, meaning what it literally says. However, the reversal of some constituents of the utterance is a violation of the cultural expectation: it reminds us of the largely held belief that “Our friends are always there when we need them”. This utterance does not seem to communicate the opposite of what is said.

The foregoing discussion indicates that the setting and violation of maxim quality are not sufficient for triggering irony. Grice’s account of ironic utterances does not seem to be the case that verbal irony violates the maxim of Quality in any reliable way. It also indicates that failing to meet the cultural implicit expectations trigger ironic intentions, though what is said cannot be seen always as communicating the exact opposite of what is intended.

7. Conclusion

The idea that irony typically and intentionally implies a meaning quite opposite to its literal sense is lacking a clear rational purpose in communication. To be more rational, one should deal with utterances as having particular effects whose interpretation is not only limited to violating the quality maxim. Verbal irony comes in so many different forms, of which some can be assertions, though triggering ironic intentions, as indicated earlier. Likewise, the interpretation of an ironically intended remark does not always derive from the interlocutors having common knowledge and beliefs about the proposition in order to interpret it as the opposite of its literal sense. Grice’s claims that the speaker and the hearer must have shared knowledge about the proposition can never properly represent verbal irony as a social phenomenon whose use is often not essentially designed to communicate either literal information or conversational implicature. An ironic utterance can mean what it exactly says or even more without necessarily pointing in the opposite direction of the literal meaning, or entailing shared knowledge or beliefs between the speaker and hearer, as examples shown earlier. For this reason, the traditional view of irony suffers a crucial flaw by claiming that irony expresses only a specific, opposite meaning to the detriment of other possible meanings. The standard definition of verbal irony, therefore, seems to be lacking clarity and thus unreliable in linguistic studies. This perception calls for a redefinition of irony that accommodates different types of ironically intended utterances to disambiguate the abuse of this rhetorical device.
هل التناقض ضروري لتفسير السخرية اللغوية؟

محمد القرعان ومحمود الكناكري، قسم الترجمة، جامعة اليرموك، إريد، الأردن.

ملخص

التهكم النفطي بمفهومه التقليدي هو أن يعني المتكلم عكس ما يقول حرفيًا. لذلك يرى الباحثان أن المتكلم يقصد التهكما إذا خالف ما يقوله ما يقصده. وليس بالضرورة أن يكون المعنى المقصود عكس المعنى الظاهرة. وبناء على ذلك، برهن البحث أن النظرية التقليدية لمعنى التهكما النفطي ليست كافية للتعبير عن أشكال التهكما النفطي كاففة، وليس شرطًا ضروريًا لتفسير معنى التهكما النفطي. ورددت الدراسة بشكل خاص إلى اثبات وجود التهكما النفطي حتى وإن كان التمكما يعني تاما ما يقوله حرفيًا، فتأثير القصد من التهكما النفطي لا يكون نتيجة عدم قول الحقيقة فحسب بل يكون نتيجة عدم الانترام بمبدأ أكثر من مبدأ التأدب في القول، ومطابقة القول للمقام الذين يسهمان كذلك إبراز نية المتكلم في التهكما.

أما ترتيب القصة فهو كالآتي:

أولاً: تبدأ القصة بالقمينة فتعبر معنى التهكما النفطي بمفهومه التقليدي الذي لا يبدو أنه يعبر بعض الشيء في الدراسات اللغوية.

ثانياً: تقدم الورقة مبدأ التعاون الذي يبين أن التهكما يكون من خلال الإخلال بمبدأ الصدق في القول.

رابعاً: يدلل هذا الجزء من البحث على أن التهكما النفطي ليس بالضرورة لنونا من النفي الضمني. ويرى البحث أن التهكما لا يقصد منه عكس ما يقلح حرفيًا إلا إذا كان التمكما والساعم يملكان المعينة عن الموضوع بطريقة الحال ويستنتج منه السامع أن يقصد السخيرة.

خامساً: يوضح هذا الجزء من البحث أن ترجمة التهكما على أنه نفي أمر مستدجأن النفي ليس نفياً واحداً لجزء محدد من التعبير، فقد يكون للجملة كلها أو لجزء من التعبير.

ويختتم توضيح المقالة أن النظرية التقليدية للتهكما النفطي ليست كافية لتفسير التهكما بمظاهره المختلفة. وأن الافتراض بأن التمكما والساعم يملكان معينة مشتركة عن موضوع التهكما ليست قائمًا في كل حالة من حالات التهكما. ولذلك يحتاج معنى التهكما النفطي إلى إعادة تحريف لوضع تصور جديد لمعنى هذا الفهم الذي يتداخل في معاناه مع مفاهيم أخرى مثل الغلطة والسخرية من جهة، ولوقف سوء استخدام هذه الوسيلة المجازية.

الكلمات الفتتاحية: إعادة صياغة المعنى، تبدأ الصدق في القول، مبرهنة فهم الناس، النفي، مفهوم التعلق، مبدأ التأدب أو التأدب.
Is Oppositeness Necessary for the Interpretation of Verbal Irony?

References